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Zusammenfassung 
In einer impliziten Lernaufgabe, wie der seriellen Wahlreaktionszeit-Aufgabe, erwerben die meisten 
Personen unbewusst Wissen über die zugrundeliegende Regelhaftigkeit. In der Regel gibt es aber 
auch immer eine kleine Gruppe Personen, welcher diese Regelhaftigkeit auffällt und diese auch 
berichten kann. Da das Bewusstsein über eine erworbene Repräsentation entscheidend dafür ist, wie 
flexibel und vielfältig dieses Wissen eingesetzt werden kann, ist es von großem Interesse, Verständnis 
darüber zu erlangen, welche Mechanismen den Übergang von unbewusstem zu bewusstem Wissen 
realisieren.  
In bisherigen Forschungsarbeiten haben sich zwei zentrale Strömungen ausgebildet, welche 
sich dieser Frage widmen. Zum einen besteht die sparsamste Annahme darin, dass unbewusste 
Repräsentationen durch Übung zunehmend an Qualität gewinnen und so graduell in einen 
bewussten Zustand übergehen (Single-System Annahme; z.B. Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). Dem 
gegenüber stehen komplexere Modelle, welche annehmen dass implizite und explizite 
Repräsentationen durch separate Lern- und Gedächtnissysteme gestützt werden (Multiple-System 
Annahme). Eines dieser Modelle ist die Unexpected Event Hypothese (Frensch et al., 2003). Diese 
besagt, dass implizites Lernen zu Verhaltensänderungen führt, welche in Widerspruch zu den 
Erwartungen der Person über ihr eigenes Verhalten in der jeweiligen Situation stehen. Diese 
Erwartungsverletzung löst einen Attributionsprozess aus, anhand welchem Erwartung und Erleben 
wieder in Kohärenz gebracht werden sollen; das Resultat kann die plötzliche Einsicht in die 
zugrundeliegende Regel sein.  
Die vorliegenden drei Studien haben zum Ziel die Vorhersagen der Unexpected Event 
Hypothese zu testen und diese den Vorhersagen einer sparsameren Single-System Annahme 
gegenüber zu stellen. In allen drei Studien werden daher in einer impliziten Lernsituation über 
verschiedene Manipulationen unerwartete Ereignisse induziert. Gleichzeitig sind alle Aufgaben so 
entwickelt, dass die assoziative Stärke der Repräsentationen zwischen den Manipulationen nicht 
variieren soll.  
In Studie 1 wird in drei Experimenten das subjektive Gefühl der Flüssigkeit anhand der 
Anordnung regelhafter und zufälliger Durchgänge als unerwartetes Ereignis manipuliert. Experiment 
1 zeigt, dass die Anordnung der verschiedenen Durchgangstypen keinen Einfluss auf die assoziative 
Stärke der erworbenen Repräsentationen zu haben scheint. Experiment 2 zeigt, dass diese 
Anordnung tatsächlich das subjektive Flüssigkeitsempfinden beeinflusst. Experiment 3 zeigt 
abschließend, dass TeilnehmerInnen, welche größere Unterschiede im subjektiven 
Flüssigkeitsempfinden wahrnehmen, auch mehr explizites Wissen erwerben.  
In Studie 2 und 3 werden kontingente Handlungseffekte als unerwartete Ereignisse 
eingesetzt. Dabei wird in Studie 2 die Handlungs-Effekt Kontingenz durch das bei den 
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TeilnehmerInnen induzierte Task-Set manipuliert. Im Verlauf von zwei Experimenten wird zunächst 
geprüft, ob die Manipulation des Task-Sets tatsächlich die Entstehung expliziten Sequenzwissens 
beeinflusst. Anschließend wird in einem dritten Experiment geprüft, inwiefern dieser Effekt spezifisch 
für explizite, aber nicht implizite Lernprozesse ist. In Studie 3 hingegen wird eine direktere 
Manipulation der Handlungs-Effekt Kontingenz verwendet. Hierbei sind die Effekte entweder an die 
Handlungen der Teilnehmer oder an eine aufgaben-irrelevante Stimulusdimension gebunden. Die 
Studien 2 und 3 zeigen vermehrt explizites Sequenzwissen, wenn die TeilnehmerInnen kontingente 
Handlungseffekte erleben. Diese Befunde werden ebenfalls im Rahmen der Unexpected Event 
Hypothese interpretiert.  
Insgesamt zeigen alle drei Studien mehr explizites Wissen bei Personen, welche unerwartete 
Ereignisse erlebten. Da alle Studien darauf ausgelegt sind, die assoziative Stärke zwischen den 
Bedingungen gleich zu halten und nur die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines unerwarteten Ereignisses zu 
manipulieren, scheinen die Ergebnisse dafür zu sprechen, dass die Unexpected Event Hypothese 
einer einfachen Single-System Annahme vorzuziehen ist.  
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Abstract 
In an implicit learning task like the serial reaction time task, most people demonstrate implicit 
knowledge about the underlying regularity. Usually, a small group of persons can be found which 
notices this regularity and is also able to report it. Because whether the acquired representation can 
be used in a flexible and diverse way crucially depends on conscious awareness of this knowledge, it 
is of great importance to understand which mechanisms realize the transition from implicit to explicit 
knowledge.  
Research on this issue has led to two main theoretical streams. On the one hand, the most 
parsimonious account assumes that unconscious representations gain quality through practice and 
therefore gradually transform into explicit knowledge (single-system account; e.g. Cleeremans & 
Jiménez, 2002). On the other hand, there are more complex models which assume that implicit and 
explicit representations are supported by separable learning- and memory systems (multiple-systems 
account). One of these models is the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., 2003). Within this 
model, it is proposed that implicit learning leads to behavioral changes which contradict the 
expectations of a person about their own behavior in the given situation. This violation of 
expectations triggers an attributional process which should bring expectation and experience back 
into coherence; a sudden insight into the underlying rule can be the result.  
The three studies presented here are aimed at testing the predictions of the Unexpected 
Event Hypothesis and contrast these with the more parsimonious predictions of a single system 
account. Therefore, in all three studies, different manipulations will induce unexpected events in an 
implicit learning situation. At the same time, all tasks are designed in a way to match the associative 
strength of the representations between the manipulations.  
In Study 1 in three experiments, the subjective feeling of fluency is manipulated through the 
arrangement of regular and random trials in order to establish an unexpected event. Experiment 1 
shows that the arrangement of the different trial-types does not affect the associative strength of 
the acquired representational. Experiment 2 shows that the arrangement of the trial-types affects 
the subjective experience of fluency. Lastly, Experiment 3 demonstrates that participants who 
experienced greater differences in their subjective feeling of fluency exhibit more explicit knowledge.  
In Study 2 and 3, contingent action-effects establish the unexpected events. In Study 2 the 
action-effect contingency is manipulated by the induced task-set of the participants. First, over the 
course of two experiments, it is tested whether the manipulation of the task-set affects the 
emergence of explicit sequence knowledge. Subsequently, in a third experiment, it is tested whether 
this effect is specific for explicit but not implicit learning processes. In Study 3, on the contrary a 
more direct manipulation of the action-effect contingency is used. Here, the effects are either bound 
to the responses of the participants or to a task-irrelevant stimulus dimension. Studies 2 and 3 show 
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enhanced explicit sequence knowledge when participants experienced contingent action-effects. 
These results are interpreted in favor of the Unexpected Event Hypothesis. 
Together, all three studies demonstrate more explicit knowledge in participants who 
experienced unexpected events. Because all studies were aimed at keeping the associative strength 
equal across the conditions equal and only manipulate the likelihood of unexpected events, the 
results seem in favor of the Unexpected Event Hypothesis over the simpler single system account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Content  
1      Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 8 
2 Scientific Theories of Consciousness ................................................................................. 10 
 2.1      The Global Workspace Theory ............................................................................................. 11 
 2.2      Higher-Order Thought Theories .......................................................................................... 14 
3 The Transition from Implicit to Explicit Knowledge .................................................... 17 
 3.1      Single-System Views ................................................................................................................ 18 
 3.2      Multiple-System Views............................................................................................................ 24 
4 Empirical Evidence for Single- and Multiple-System Views ........................................ 32 
 4.1      Measures for Implicit and Explicit Knowledge ............................................................... 32 
 4.2      Empirical Evidence for Single-System Views .................................................................. 35 
 4.3      Empirical Evidence for Multiple-System Views .............................................................. 37 
5 Overview of the Studies ......................................................................................................... 42 
5.1      Study 1: The Emergence of Explicit Knowledge in a Serial Reaction Time Task: 
The Role of Experienced Fluency and Strength of Representation....................................... 42 
5.2      Study 2: Implicit Visual Learning: How the Task Set Modulates Learning by 
Determining the Stimulus-Response Binding .............................................................................. 45 
 5.3      Study 3: Action-Effects Enhance Explicit Sequential Learning .................................. 48 
6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 52 
Literature .......................................................................................................................................... 58 
Appendix: Published Articles and Contributions of the Authors ...................................... 71 
Introduction 
8 
 
1 Introduction  
Our world is full of structured information. Sometimes this structure is rather simple and fully 
deterministic like the few keys on a keyboard one has to remember to type at an acceptable speed. 
Sometimes it is highly complex and probabilistic, like social interactions where small modifications of 
facial expressions or the choice of words can profoundly change the impression we leave on other 
people. Luckily, we are able to pick up this information and learn to predict our environment to a 
satisfactory certainty. This ability alleviates our day-to-day lives invaluably or, to a certain extent, 
enables them in the first place. In this respect it is usually unnecessary and, given the serial nature of 
conscious processing, often also impossible to be consciously aware of all the hidden rules that guide 
our behavior. Yet it remains mysterious why sometimes we become aware of the rules that structure 
information. Of course, sometimes we become aware of them simply because we are asked to do so, 
for example when someone asks us for the directions to a certain location. At other times however, 
we experience a sudden insight into knowledge that was entirely unconscious before. For example 
when we realize that a friend we sometimes play poker with becomes very quiet when they have a 
good hand.  
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for such insights to occur? Answering this 
question is not only interesting per se as it could provide important practical implications, for 
example in an educational context, but also to much more fundamental interests. Understanding the 
transition from unconscious to conscious knowledge can help with the further development of 
scientific theories of consciousness. How and why is neural information processing sometimes 
accompanied by conscious knowledge of its contents and in which qualities does this processing 
differ from one that is not accompanied by consciousness? How are representational quality or 
strength and consciousness related? What is the significance of interaction with and feedback from 
the external world? 
From a scientific view, implicit learning research can provide very interesting insights into the 
necessary conditions for a transition from unconscious to conscious knowledge. Here, the typical 
paradigm for implicit learning, the Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) can 
reflect everyday situations with deterministic and probabilistic contingencies. These contingencies 
can be of arbitrary complexity and can occur within various stimulus- and response dimensions (e.g. 
motor, visual, auditive, spatial, and temporal). It has been shown repeatedly that learning in the SRTT 
can result in implicit, unconscious knowledge about the hidden sequential contingencies (see 
Abrahamse, Jiménez, Verwey, & Clegg, 2010, for a review). The paradigm provides a vast horizon of 
Introduction 
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possible manipulations, not only concerning the content of what can be learned implicitly but also 
concerning the factors that can influence the rate of conscious insights into the hidden structures of 
the task. The following studies are aimed at testing two accounts about the generation of conscious, 
explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation. These two accounts are usually treated separately 
despite surely being compatible. The first account concerns the role of metacognitive judgements 
and is treated in study 1. Moreover, in this study the importance of metacognitive judgements 
relying on observance of one’s own behavior is contrasted with a simpler single system account 
according to which representational strength is seen as the variable on which conscious knowledge 
depends. The second account is less directly related to the transition from implicit to explicit 
knowledge and rather finds its roots in the investigation of intentional action control as opposed to 
stimulus-based action control. The topic of discussion here is action-effect learning. The studies 2 and 
3 both investigate the assumption that experiencing contingent action-effects is an important source 
of external feedback that promotes a shift from unconscious, stimulus-based to conscious plan-based 
control. 
Before these studies are presented, the following chapters provide a short insight into the 
scientific theories of unconscious and conscious processing, which build the crucial basis for any 
further thoughts on how these two forms of processing are related (Chapter 2). Building on this, a 
more specified summary will be given on how the transition from unconscious to conscious 
processing is treated in the field of implicit learning. In that context two important theoretical 
viewpoints, single- and multiple-system views, will be summarized and compared (Chapter 3). Finally, 
an overview of the empirical evidence which has accumulated for both opposing viewpoints so far 
will shortly be discussed with regard to open points that are subject of the present studies (Chapter 
4). 
Scientific Theories of Consciousness 
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2 Scientific Theories of Consciousness 
In order to investigate the transition from unconscious to conscious knowledge, it is of indispensable 
importance to think about the highly controversial possibilities to conceive a scientifically seizable 
theory of consciousness. There are two positions which, at the current point of time, share an equally 
strong degree of influence in the literature on consciousness. In their most reduced form, both 
positions can be separated by either postulating or disputing a differentiation between “easy” and 
“hard” problems of consciousness research. These terms go back to Chalmers 1995 who said that it is 
“easy” for science to identify the (neuronal) mechanisms that support cognitive functions and which 
have a strong relatedness to conscious processing. These include language, attention, executive 
functions or generally any process that is traceable with objective measures. Nevertheless, even after 
all cognitive functions have been explained, consciousness, according to this view, has an inherently 
subjective, phenomenal component, also referred to as qualia, that will not be explained by 
understanding information processing. Due to its impenetrable first-person nature, it would remain 
unanswered how and why these cognitive mechanisms are accompanied by a subjective feeling of 
being conscious; this is what is called the “hard” problem. A similar idea stands behind the separation 
between so-called “access”- and “phenomenal” consciousness (Block, 1995). Access consciousness 
refers to any information that is made available to a broad network of cognitive functions. This 
includes verbalization, categorization, reasoning, planning or more generally anything that subsumes 
under cognitive control. Phenomenal consciousness, as Block (2007, p. 487) put it, “overflows 
access”. Phenomenal consciousness has the property of containing richer information than what we 
can report or voluntarily act upon, again touching the subjective first-person characteristic of 
consciousness. Several neuroscientific theories that agree with this dissociative view have been put 
up, trying to explain phenomenal consciousness. These, for example, pronounce the relevance of 
local recurrency of information (Block, 2005, 2007; Lamme, 2006), assume that a holistic macro-
consciousness is comprised of distributed nodes that each a create micro-consciousness (e.g. color, 
sound, etc.; Zeki, 2003) or take an evolutionary route by postulating that neurons form temporary 
coalitions to compete for access to attentional systems (Crick & Koch, 1990).  
Consciousness researchers of the other camp heavily disagree with a divide between access- 
and phenomenal consciousness. The most prominent representative of these views, Daniel Dennett, 
claims that the assumption of a special property as qualia or phenomenal consciousness is 
“scientifically insupportable and deeply misleading” (Dennett, 2015, p. 2). The reason for this is that 
there never can be an experimental setting that is able to study consciousness in the absence of 
access and function. According to proponents of the existence of qualia, in a “perfect (thought) 
experiment”, isolating the perception of the color “red” of an apple from all other cognitive functions 
should lead to a phenomenal but inaccessible consciousness about the apples redness. Nevertheless, 
Scientific Theories of Consciousness 
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the scientist would find a person who verbally insures that they do not see red, that they do not feel 
anything they associate with this color and who is not able to act upon this perception in any possible 
way, because the center for color cannot communicate with any other functional area (Cohen & 
Dennett, 2011). Phenomenal consciousness, according to this view, cannot be falsified and would 
have to rely on arbitrarily chosen criteria independent of subjective and functional observations and 
is therefore by definition a question of believing but not of science. Functional theories of 
consciousness on the contrary assume that there is no brain state independent of function. 
Consciousness is fully explained once it has been understood how cognitive processes interact. The 
interaction of this multitude of processes, most importantly attention, working memory, language 
and decision making processes, is consciousness. There is no additional process that produces 
consciousness. The task for a science of consciousness is to specify, in a falsifiable way, which 
functions are necessary for consciousness and how these functions can be measured adequately.  
Understanding these differences between functional approaches to consciousness and those 
that assume that there is an extra process creating phenomenal consciousness is vital for the further 
understanding of the definition and the measures of unconscious and conscious knowledge behind 
our hypotheses. In the following, two important functional theories behind our hypotheses about the 
transition from implicit to explicit knowledge will be introduced shortly.  
 
2.1 The Global Workspace Theory 
The Global Workspace Theory (GWT; Baars, 1997, 2005; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006) was one of the first 
scientific functional theories of consciousness that seems capable of abolishing the homunculus 
problem many other approaches have, especially those assuming a separable phenomenal 
consciousness.  
The homunculus problem encompasses two difficulties: The first is the assumption that there 
are certain networks or certain neurons which create consciousness, and which constitute a place 
where consciousness happens. This place is termed the Cartesian Theatre by Dennett (1991). The 
implication here is that there is an entity (the homunculus) additional to brain states, for whom or 
which information needs to be presented in order to exert control, and which leads to the subjective 
experience of a stream of consciousness. Introducing such an entity necessarily leads back to the 
hard problem, asking why and how neuronal information becomes transformed into conscious 
information in the first place. The second problem with any theory implicitly comprising a 
homunculus is that it also has to explain how the information which gets presented is selected from 
Scientific Theories of Consciousness 
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the enormous pool of unconscious information and how consciousness as a final product can have a 
causal influence on unconscious brain processes.  
The GWT aims at solving both of these problems. Most importantly, the GWT does not 
assume that there is any specified area in the brain where consciousness is created; rather, 
consciousness is equalized with global availability of information. The basic assumption of the GWT is 
that the brain contains a multitude of functionally highly specialized areas working in parallel. 
Information in these areas is unconscious, there is no micro-consciousness or anything alike 
associated with information processing in these networks. Per se, these networks work 
encapsulated, that means they exchange information only within hard-wired or acquired pathways 
to fulfill their specialized task. This specialization enables the brain to handle a massive amount of 
input in parallel (Baars, 1997). Nevertheless, coherent interaction with the environment requires 
serial output and therefore a mechanism is needed that selects information and puts it into the focus 
of attention. Here, the theory postulates that there is a global workspace (GWS) which provides the 
necessary infrastructure, neurologically mainly realized by thalamo-cortical long-distance neurons of 
the prefrontal and the anterior cingular cortex (see Baars, Franklin, & Ramsøy, 2013 for a detailed 
elaboration of the neuronal architecture). The GWS is able to select relevant information, prevents 
interference, allows the encapsulated modules to exchange information and flexibly establishes 
temporary networks between these modules (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). The GWT uses a 
blackboard as a metaphor for imagining how the GWS works. When a module gets selected to enter 
the GWS, it can broadcast its content to any other network in the brain.  Other modules can use this 
information from the blackboard and process it in their specified function. The information of the 
broadcasted module is no longer encapsulated. It is now said to be amodal because it is no longer 
bound to the specialized processes of the module it originated from, but instead is now processed in 
a broad context of unconscious subsystems. These subsystems include, for example, perception, 
language, intentions, self-concepts, expectations, memory, and also exclusive access to working-
memory function (Baars, 1997, 2005; Baars et al. 2013; see Figure 1). Neuroimaging shows that this 
de-capsulation of information is accompanied by a neurological “ignition”, a sudden, strong 
activation of a vast variety of cortical and subcortical regions (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene 
& Naccache, 2001).  
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Figure 1. Schematic global workspace model (Baars et al., 2013). Conscious experience corresponds to the 
information currently being represented in working memory and focused by attention. Conscious contents 
have access to a broad range of unconscious modules (self-systems, intentions, etc.), which set the context for 
the conscious information, and define the quality of subjective experience. Furthermore, the information 
currently in the global workspace is accessible to unconscious resources (memory systems, language, etc.) 
which can process this information according to their specialized function. All unconscious modules constantly 
send feedback to the global workspace and can enter the global workspace themselves, if their activational 
strength signals high relevance to the current goals. It is the function of the global workspace to converge the 
parallel input of the various specialized modules and allow serial behavioral output.  
 
This conception of consciousness resembles the perfect thought experiment of Cohen & 
Dennett (2011) described in Chapter 2. There is neither a certain mechanism that creates 
consciousness, nor is there a certain place in the brain where consciousness happens. Consciousness 
is the global accessibility of information. The apple is consciously perceived as being red because the 
encapsulated, unconscious color module is allowed to communicate with all the just named 
subsystems. Further, a broad variety of inner thoughts and emotions, as well as options to openly act 
upon this perception, becomes enabled. Even though the GWS is said to rely on long-distance 
neurons of the PFC and the ACC, the GWS is not located in any certain area. It is a virtual space, 
dynamically changing with the contents being processed and the functions being involved.  
             As mentioned above, the GWT also aims at solving the question of how the information which 
is most relevant for current action planning gets selected to be distributed via the GWS. The problem 
of theories that comprise a homunculus assume a top-down control process where some supervising 
entity decides which information is the most important at any point of time. Which modules should 
be considered as being relevant and what would the consequences of this selection be? Obviously, a 
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mechanism that tests all potentially relevant unconscious modules would be stuck in a combinatorial 
explosion, never coming to any successful decision (see the Frame-Problem, Dennett, 1984). Instead, 
the GWT suggests a bottom-up stochastic variation-selection mechanism (neural Darwinism, 
Changeux & Dehaene, 1989). Every unconscious module constantly competes for access to the GWS 
(variation component), while the GWS sets a selection function depending on current goal states. 
Only one module or coalition of modules will show the strongest activation in the context of the 
current goal-state depended content of the GWS and will therefore win the competition for global 
broadcasting (Shanahan & Baars, 2005). For example, driving in a car at night can lead to the 
consciously represented plan to watch out for any moving objects near the road. Any information 
stemming from a network that processes movement information will receive extra activational 
strength. In this case any moving object will gain access over a signal with higher bottom-up strength, 
for example a talking passenger. Yet, very strong bottom-up signal strength might still win over a 
signal that fits the current fitness function and “break through into consciousness” (Baars, 2005, p. 
49), for example when the passenger starts yelling at you. 
Taken together, the GWT provides a scientifically accessible conception of consciousness 
because it allows testable predictions about the observable functions that should separate conscious 
from unconscious processing. Therefore it also qualifies as an important background to think about 
the conditions for a transition from implicit to explicit (sequence) knowledge. Before considering the 
plausibility of different theories that are concerned with this more specific question in Chapter 3, one 
further important theory of consciousness should be presented here, namely the Higher-Order 
Thought Theory.   
 
2.2 Higher-Order Thought Theories 
The Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) in its most popular form goes back to the work of 
Rosenthal (1997). Different from the neurologically oriented GWT, the HOTT originally was much 
more related to the philosophical side of consciousness theories. Nevertheless, it has developed to 
be a theory with empirically testable predictions which also is compatible with the current 
neurological and cognitive state of knowledge. The HOTT is concerned with the metacognitive 
aspects of consciousness. In its core, it differentiates between first-order and second-order (or 
higher-order) states. First-order states refer to simple input-output rules of any sensory or motor 
system. This can be understood in analogy to the parallel working modules in the GWT. Encapsulated 
information processing can be seen as a first-order state which per se is unconscious. Not only the 
human brain, but any simple or complex machine which shows discriminatory performance has first 
order states (e.g. perceiving light of a certain wavelength results in the output of detecting red). 
Scientific Theories of Consciousness 
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Consciousness, according to the HOTT, crucially depends on developing higher-order knowledge 
about this first-order knowledge. Consciousness means knowing that one knows. This comprises the 
ability for self-reflection, self-reference and a propositional attitude (e.g. “I know/believe/guess that 
it is red that I see”, “It is I, who sees red”, “it is red that I see”). What is needed for consciousness is a 
mechanism that allows the brain to draw inferences about its own internal first-order states and 
about how these relate to states in the environment. Lau (2008a) suggests a Bayesian learning 
approach to describe the relation between perceptual first-order states and meta-cognitive higher-
order judgements about these states. This approach builds on psychophysical signal-detection 
theory. Every performance depends on the sensitivity (d’) of a processing unit and its decision-
criterion (c). Many studies on (un-) conscious perception use d’ as a measure for awareness (d’ = 0 is 
interpreted as unconscious perception). Lau (2008a) argues that operationalizing unconscious 
perception as d’ = 0 severely underestimates the potential of unconscious processing as it only 
reflects poor perceptual performance capacity. Instead, he suggests that the decision criterion c is of 
much greater relevance for studies of consciousness. In a related  study (Lau & Passingham, 2006), it 
has been demonstrated that manipulating attention towards a masked stimulus can result in equal 
sensitivity towards the stimulus but very different subjective reports of having seen or having not 
seen the stimulus. Likewise, the widespread cortical activity which the GWT relates to conscious 
processing is, according to Lau and Passingham, a confound due to differences in performance. When 
performance was matched, subjective reports of consciousness were only related to increased 
activity in the dorsolateral cortex.  
What is important for the HOTT is how the cognitive system comes to a decision about its 
own internal states and their reference to external stimuli. Bayesian decision theory can help to 
understand how an optimal criterion is set.  Via external feedback, the cognitive system can develop 
a first-order representation of the probability of a certain signal strength when a signal is present and 
when it is not. Additionally, the system also has to learn the base rate of the stimulus. Given these 
two probabilities, the cognitive system can estimate the opposite likeliness that a stimulus is present, 
given a certain signal strength, which is important for making optimal decisions. However, people 
often seem to fail to set an optimal criterion. A common and easily accessible example are blindsight 
patients, who, according to Lau (2008a), set very conservative criteria even though their 
performance is well above chance. Likewise, and more related to the content of the research 
presented in the following, experimental studies on unconscious learning and perception show the 
same above-chance performance while the participants claim that they are merely guessing 
(Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Dienes & Berry, 1997). Lau (2008a) therefore argues that metacognitive 
higher-order representations need to be assumed in order to explain how the criterion for a 
subjective judgement about the accuracy of one`s own responses or, more general, perceptual 
consciousness is set. A higher-order mechanism is assumed which develops a representation of its 
own internal first-order signals which are related to the external world. For example, a person might 
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learn via feedback that the mean fire rate for a signal being present is 25 Hz and a signal being absent 
is 10 Hz and sets an optimal criterion at 17.5 Hz. Now, due to a lesion, the internal signal decreases 
strongly and the first-order distributions now show a mean of 15 Hz for a signal and 5 Hz for noise. 
Failing to learn about these new internal distributions would result in keeping the criterion at 17.5 Hz 
which now leads to a very high amount of false-negatives, as can be observed in blindsight patients. 
Recently, Fleming and Daw (2017) gave a more detailed, computational description of the learning 
processes behind the development of metacognitive criterion setting. Thereby the authors also go 
into deeper detail between first-order criteria that reflect how a person might react to a stimulus 
(e.g. pressing or not pressing a button) and higher-order judgements of having consciously perceived 
something.  
Taken together, HOTTs also provide a theoretical base for functionally discriminating 
unconscious from conscious processing. While the GWT is more focused on the behavioral 
enrichment that comes along with conscious processing on various levels (controllability, flexibility, 
verbalization, integration, combination, etc.), HOTTs rather pronounce the subjective, 
phenomenological side of conscious processing (Rosenthal, 2008). Without (unfalsifiably) assuming 
that there is a phenomenology to first-order processing, HOTTs propose that consciousness is given 
when a person can represent being (or not being) in a certain state. 
The Transition from Implicit to Explicit Knowledge 
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3 The Transition from Implicit to Explicit Knowledge 
Implicit learning became a popular research topic in cognitive psychology in the 1960s when George 
Miller (1958) established the paradigm of Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL). He demonstrated that 
participants learned to become sensitive to letter strings that followed hidden rule, even though they 
were not explicitly informed about these rules. Arthur Reber (1967) later explored the implicit 
aspect, namely the inability of the participants to verbally express any of their knowledge about the 
hidden grammar, more deeply. From then on, the interest in the ability to learn without being 
conscious of what has been learned or even that anything has been learned at all, spread to areas 
outside of linguistic research. This included paradigms on probability learning (A. Reber & Millward, 
1965), dynamic system control (Berry & Broadbent, 1984) and, most important to the studies at 
hand, sequence learning within the Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT), going back to Nissen & 
Bullemer (1987). Naturally, there has been an extensive, productive and still not univocally settled 
debate on whether the knowledge acquired in these tasks can be said to be unconscious. Over the 
many years of research on unconscious processing, convincing empirical evidence accumulated to 
justify the assumption of unconscious influences on behavior which functionally differ from 
consciously perceived input (Alamia et al., 2016; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Still there are scientists 
who hold the strong opinion that it has yet to be shown that there is such a thing as unconscious 
perception or decision making (Newell & Shanks, 2014; Peters & Lau, 2015; Shanks, 2016; Tran & 
Pashler, 2017). Surely, productive criticism on the methods being used to distinguish unconscious 
from conscious processing should not be dismissed easily. However, in the light of the above shortly 
introduced functional theories of consciousness, the assumption that there is no unconscious 
processing to be found, entails some theoretical problem which will shortly be discussed in Chapter 
3.1. 
Presuming that there are unconscious processes that influence behavior, implicit learning 
paradigms, especially the SRTT, provide immensely powerful tools not only for demonstrating the 
ubiquity and flexibility of implicit learning processes but moreover for studying the requirements for 
a transition from unconscious knowledge to conscious insight into this knowledge. Priming research, 
the probably most prominent paradigm for unconscious processing, has the difficulty that stimulus 
signal strength and task performance capacity are often not matched between the conditions (Lau, 
2008a; 2008b). This means that comparing a dim, brief, masked or an “unseen” stimulus with a 
clearly visible or “seen” stimulus should result in different performances without the need to assume 
conscious and unconscious processing.  
Implicit learning paradigms as the SRTT, by contrast, allow training people with a certain 
sequence over a long period of time leading to a strong implicit knowledge base. Thus, in sequence 
The Transition from Implicit to Explicit Knowledge 
18 
 
learning paradigms it is possible to match the associative strength, and therefore the signal strength, 
between conditions as well as the difficulty and therefore the task performance capacity. At the 
same time factors that are suspected to influence whether participants gain insight into the hidden 
sequence can be manipulated. Of course, the underlying theory about the nature of consciousness 
influences which measures can differentiate between unconscious and conscious processing and also 
strongly influence which manipulations are expected to influence the transition of unconscious to 
conscious sequence knowledge (see Chapter 4.1).  
Moreover, the differences in the theoretical conception of conscious and unconscious 
processing also are reflected in implicit learning research. There is a long and not yet solved debate 
about the nature and the relation of implicit and explicit knowledge. The manifoldness of the 
different theoretical perspectives can best be simplified by dividing them into single- and multiple-
system accounts. The following sections of this chapter present the most influential theories within 
both of these views. It is described how these accounts characterize implicit and explicit learning 
processes and how the transition from implicit to explicit knowledge is imagined. Furthermore, a 
short evaluation of the theoretical views on consciousness behind them is provided.  
 
3.1 Single-System Views 
The core assumption of single-system views within implicit learning research is that there is no need 
to assume any additional process which transforms unconscious into conscious knowledge. Yet, there 
are two classes of single-system views which differ strongly in their underlying assumption about the 
nature of consciousness. This difference lies in their stance on the verifiability of unconscious 
processing. Even though unconscious processing is supposed to be empirically demonstrated in a 
vast and long history of scientific research (see Kouider & Dehaene, 2007, for an overview), there still 
are scientists who reject that such successful demonstrations exist (Newell & Shanks, 2014; 
Perruchet & Vinter, 2002; Peters & Lau, 2015; Shanks & St John, 1994).  
Some of these scientists state that unconscious processing has simply not been 
demonstrated convincingly even though it probably exists (Peters & Lau, 2015). Others (Perruchet & 
Vinter, 2002) instead put forward the strong hypothesis that there is an isomorphism between 
phenomenal experience and acquired knowledge about the world, hence that all mental 
representations are conscious. This latter assumption is incompatible with the functional views on 
consciousness, outlined in the former chapter. The idea of all representations being conscious cannot 
be falsified and is, depending on the understanding of the term “representation”, also tautological. 
The authors define representations as “mental events” which are “involved in reasoning, inference, 
action planning, and other mental activities” (p. 299). They set an arbitrary cut-off where some 
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neural activity, for example the change in connective weights, does not count as a representation 
yet. Therefore, according to this view, if a participant is trained in a SRTT and internally builds new 
associative weights, these weights are either below an arbitrary threshold and do not count as a 
representation or they exceed this threshold and can be tested via a direct knowledge test. So for 
these authors, a simple recognition task or a free generation task can demonstrate conscious 
sequence knowledge (Perruchet & Amorim, 1992). However, a large body of work has shown that 
above-chance performance in these tasks can differ profoundly from the persons’ subjective 
experience of knowing (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Dienes & Berry, 1997) as well as it can differ 
from objective tests which require control of this knowledge (e.g. responding with the button which 
is the most unlikely to be next, Debner & Jacboy, 1994). Because of the theoretical pitfalls of this 
conception of conscious knowledge, this view is of no further importance to the studies at hand.  
The methodological viewpoint that there has been no convincing demonstration of 
unconscious knowledge might be of somewhat more relevance to the following experiments. It 
surely is beyond the scope of this work to extensively debate on whether all studies have been 
adequately taken into account by the authors doubting that there has been a convincing 
demonstration of unconscious knowledge (Newell & Shanks, 2014; Peters & Lau, 2015). 
Nevertheless, the argument of the critiques is also interesting for the experiments presented here. 
As outlined in Chapter 2.2 HOTTs see the subjective criterion of perceiving or not perceiving 
something consciously as the most important or even the only relevant indicator of consciousness 
(Lau & Passingham, 2006; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). Contrary to the GWT they do not necessarily 
assume that conscious and unconscious processing will differ in objective performance capacity. 
Whether this argument can hold for all types of elaborate, complex behavior is a different debate. 
Nevertheless, Lau’s (2008a) point that operationalizing unconscious perception via d’= 0 and 
conscious perception as d’> 0 is defective, is important. Comparing a dim, brief, masked or an 
“unseen” stimulus with a clearly visible or “seen” stimulus should result in different performances, 
independent of whether this processing was unconscious or conscious.  Lau (2008b) therefore calls 
for experiments where stimulus signal strength and task performance capacity are matched between 
the conditions but still show that a difference in subjective judgements is possible. This, according to 
the critiques, could show the need for a two-system view, separating between conscious and 
unconscious processing, much more convincingly. Peter’s & Lau’s (2015) argument is based on 
priming research, where indeed it has been very common practice to compare “unseen” with “seen” 
stimuli. In such a setting, it is a difficult task to match performances with a d’ > 0 while at the same 
time ensuring that the perception of the stimuli can still potentially be unconscious.  
Implicit learning paradigms like the SRTT instead, allow training people with a certain 
sequence over a long period of time and accordingly build a strong implicit knowledge base. Various 
studies in this field show evidence that participants can discriminate between sequential and non-
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sequential trials very well (d’ > 0) while at the same time showing no subjective insight into this 
knowledge (zero-correlation criterion, Dienes & Berry, 1997; Ziori & Dienes, 2005).  Within the SRTT 
paradigm, the single-system claim that all knowledge shown in different objective tests leads back to 
conscious knowledge of different representational strength can be falsified. Here, it is easier to 
match the associative strength and therefore the signal strength as well as the difficulty and 
therefore the task performance capacity. At the same time, factors that are suspected to influence 
whether participants gain insight into the hidden sequence can be manipulated.  
Contrary to the above described viewpoint that all behavior is based on conscious 
representations, there are single-system views which might be more important to the issue of the 
following experiments. As mentioned initially, the crucial difference is that these further single-
system views assume that both unconscious and conscious processing influences our behavior. 
Nevertheless, these theories are also single-system views because they assume that there is a 
gradual difference in the representational strength of unconscious and conscious processing without 
the need to assume any transformational process or a different representational format. Bottom-up 
signal strength is viewed as a sufficient condition for the criterion that divides unconscious from 
conscious processing. This view fits well with the theories described in Chapter 2 which assume that 
there is a difference between phenomenal and access consciousness (e.g. Block, 1995; Chalmers, 
1995). There are many researchers who claim that different gradual qualities of conscious perception 
lead back to different qualities of signal strength (Block, 2007; Lamme, 2003, 2010; Overgaard, Rote, 
Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006;  Windey, Vermeiren, Atas, & Cleeremans, 2004; Zeki, 2003,). Most 
commonly, these assumptions can be found in research on visual priming (Atas, Vermeiren, & 
Cleeremans, 2013; Nieuwenhius & de Kleijn, 2011; Windey, Gevers, & Cleeremans, 2013).  
In the field of implicit sequence learning, the most influential single-system view stems from 
Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002). Different to the mentalistic view of Perruchet & Vinter (2002) they 
take a computational stance and assume that there is no subthreshold processing that does not 
count as a representation and is not assumed to be relevant for behavior. Instead, any kind of neural 
processing is constantly causally effective because any processing is embedded in a causal chain. The 
cognitive system, in their view, is best characterized as hierarchically organized, interconnected 
modules in which information processing leads to dynamic, transient patterns of activation. 
Modulated by the strength of their connections and activations, these modules influence each 
other’s processing. Their definition of a representation therefore does not refer to content in a sense 
of a “meaningful component of the represented world” (Perruchet & Vinter, p. 299). Rather, 
representations are graded, transient patterns of neural activation which can vary on different 
dimensions, influencing the “quality of [a] representation” (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002, p. 18). 
Most important to their theory, the quality of a representation is influenced by the following three 
factors: (1) Stability, i.e. the time a certain activational pattern can be maintained, (2) strength, i.e. 
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the number of modules involved and their respective activational strengths, and (3) distinctiveness, 
i.e. the extent of overlap between representations within a functional network (see Kinsbourne, 
1996, for a similar position).  
Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002) define learning as an adaptive process that necessarily 
accompanies information processing, resulting in changes of connection weights. These changes are 
termed indirect effects of learning because they do not necessarily lead to changes in subjective 
experience. Implicit learning first leads to very weak, poor quality representations. These, though 
already causally effective, might not result in noticeable subjective changes in one’s experience. But 
while these representations gain quality with further learning, their potential influence on action, 
their availability to control processes and the subjective experience also gradually changes (Figure 2). 
First there might be slight changes in the subjective experience, leading, for example, to a feeling of 
the task becoming easier and finally, as the representations gain quality, lead to full conscious 
knowledge of the acquired knowledge. The function of consciousness, within this framework, is the 
ability to control this knowledge. Yet, the authors are not fully explicit on how independent the 
ability to control knowledge, the potency of a representation and subjective experience are. They 
only state all three aspects are “closely related” (p. 22). With reference to Block (1995) it is remarked 
that there is a differentiation between access- and phenomenal consciousness within their 
framework. However, it remains open how and why representational quality affects these different 
aspects of consciousness to a different extent and, even more important, how these aspects could 
potentially be captured within their connectionist approach.  
Furthermore, in their essay, the authors state that quality of representation is crucial for 
differentiating unconscious from conscious knowledge, but also note that these are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for representations to become conscious. It is acknowledged, with a 
reference to the global workspace theory, that attention and integration of information play an 
important role in determining whether any sufficiently strong representation will eventually enter a 
state of conscious processing. This supposed involvement of top-down mechanisms is not elaborated 
any further. It is therefore not ultimately clarified whether the quality of the representation is 
changed when accessed by top-down mechanisms or how these mechanisms are triggered in the 
first place. Yet, even with this open question about the role of top-down processes and the sufficient 
conditions for the emergence of a conscious representation, the authors seemed to imply a single-
system view behind the graded characteristics of conscious processing. The consciously processed 
information is the formerly implicit information that can now be accessed, and which gains further 
strength and stability by this accessibility. There is no need for a second system supporting a 
different representational format which would be required for consciousness.  
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Figure 2. A graphical representation of the relation between quality of representation (X-axis) and availability 
to conscious experience, action, and control (Y-axis), according to Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002). It can be 
seen that all three aspects of availability gradually change from an implicit to an explicit state. Not further 
discussed in the current context is the area of automaticity, which is associated with a representation that 
became very strong due to extensive practice.  
 
Interestingly, a few years later, Cleeremans (2008, 2011, 2014; Windey & Cleeremans, 2015; 
Windey et al., 2014) modified this theory of a graded consciousness in a way that, at first glance, 
might be interpreted as a two-system account. In fact, the new model could be seen as a hybrid 
between one- and two-system accounts. Instead of further elaborating the mechanisms behind the 
access to a global workspace, Cleeremans now takes the stance that global availability is not 
sufficient for consciousness. Rather, he turns towards the ideas of higher-order thought theories. 
Through interaction with the environment, a first-order representation is developed, gradually 
improving in quality, as originally assumed in the essay by Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002). The 
crucial addition to their former stance and the new adaption to HOTTs is that the acquired first-order 
information is never conscious; it is labeled as knowledge within the system. For consciousness to 
arise, the first-order information needs to be redescribed as a metarepresentation; that is knowledge 
for the system (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). The first-order representation itself becomes an 
object of a representation for higher-order systems. This higher-order system receives input from the 
first-order systems and learns that the state of a first-order system has changed, for example 
because something has been learned, and thereby develops a higher-order attitude towards the first-
order knowledge (e.g. “I know that …”, “I hope that …”, “I see that …”). This higher-order 
representation is assumed to be a new representation involving a broad pattern of activation over 
different processing units which is only indirectly shaped by the changes of the connection-weights 
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within the first-order systems. Obviously, this justifies labeling the model of Cleeremans as a two-
system theory. Nevertheless, it also has to be considered how Cleeremans sketches the mechanism 
of the metacognitive higher-order system: It is stated that the representations of this system develop 
in the exact same way as first-order representations. The most important factor for a meta-cognitive, 
conscious representation to develop is that it gains stability, strength, and distinctiveness over the 
course of learning. More precisely, a first-order system is described as a simple feed-forward 
backpropagation network consisting of an input, a hidden, and an output unit (Figure 3). This 
network continuously develops increasing sensitivity to contingencies in the environment by 
developing associations between the input and the output and thereby improves so-called Type 1 
responses (e.g. simple discriminative responses towards a stimulus). There is no intrinsic property 
within this network that is associated with consciousness. A similarly built second-order network is 
connected to this first-order network, receives input from there and learns about the internal states 
of the first-order network. It can learn how the internal state of the first-order network was, when a 
response was correct or when it was incorrect, and thereby develops higher-order judgement-
knowledge about the first-order system possessing or not possessing knowledge in a given situation 
(Type 2 responses).  
This general principle can, for example, be extended for distinguishing between imagination 
and factual perception, knowing or guessing, remembering or predicting. It can help in deciding 
whether a situation has changed or is the same, how consistent a situation is, how similar a situation 
is to associated situations and so on. Because the same strengthening mechanism lies behind first- 
and higher-order networks, consciousness is still a gradual phenomenon, changing on a trial-by-trial 
basis. This is what gives the proposed model characteristics of a single-system theory and justifies 
categorizing it as a hybrid between single- and multiple-system views.  
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Figure 3. A schematic representation of a metacognitive network according to Cleeremans (2011). The first-
order network consists of a three-layer feedforward backpropagation network that gradually learns to produce 
a correct Type 1 response (e.g. a stimulus discrimination). The information from the first-order network is the 
input of the hidden units of a second-order network. The second-order network gradually learns to judge 
whether the first-order network has produced a wrong or correct response (Type 2 response).  
 
3.2 Multiple-System Views 
Opposed to single-system views, multiple-system views assume that implicit and explicit learning are 
supported by dissociable memory systems which build different forms of representations and are 
supported by different mechanisms. As the following section will show, multiple-system views are 
much more prominent in implicit learning research. This might be attributed to the fact that before 
implicit learning arose as a research topic around the 1960s (e.g. A. Reber, 1967), it was common to 
assume that human learning is usually guided by hypothesis-testing and leads to verbalizable, 
symbolic propositions (see e.g. models of information processing from Fodor, 1975; Newell & Simon, 
1972). It might therefore seem intuitive that learning which happens in an incidental manner, 
without any intention or instruction and is not available for verbal report, is the product of a system 
that works differently from the system assumed in common information processing models.  
The early works of Arthur Reber (1965, 1967, 1989) already imply that implicit learning 
should be differentiated from explicit learning processes in several ways.  He argued that implicit 
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learning should be imagined as a differentiation process, as opposed to an enrichment process. The 
former describes a primitive, rudimentary mechanism that develops sensitivity towards information 
in the environment and that is incapable of adding information to the provided material or using 
reflective strategies (Reber, 1967). While Reber (1965) first assumed that implicit knowledge can 
never be available to consciousness, he later (1989) assumed that additional conscious processes can 
interact with these implicitly learned representations and thereby result in conscious knowledge. 
Nevertheless, he did not specify this interaction any further.  
A first theory that was more directly concerned with the interaction of separate implicit and 
explicit learning mechanisms was introduced by Willingham (1998) in form of the so called COBALT 
(control-based learning theory). In this model it is assumed that implicit and explicit learning 
processes work independent and in parallel. Primarily conceptualized as a neuropsychological theory 
of motor-skill learning, the COBALT is based on two separable neural processing pathways. The 
implicit learning system is supposed to be located in a dorsally located pathway. Learning in this 
network is less attention-demanding and leads to rather slowly developing but stable motor-skills. 
The representations developed by the implicit system are supposed to be coded in allocentric space. 
Explicit learning on the other side is supposed to be located in a ventral pathway. Learning within the 
explicit system is highly attention-demanding but also more accurate, strategic and can develop very 
quickly through, for example, instructions, observations or hypothesis testing and is more susceptible 
to forgetting. Representations in the explicit system are supposed to be coded in egocentric space. 
Both systems do not directly interact and develop knowledge completely independent of each other. 
The only interaction between both systems which is allowed within the COBALT is that the explicit 
system can override the implicit system but not the other way around.  
A very similar account, more directly dedicated to implicit sequence learning than the 
COBALT, which is a more general theory for motor skill learning, has been developed by Keele, Ivry, 
Mayr, Hazeltine, and Heuer (2003). Their model adopts many of the ideas from the COBALT with 
some modifications. For example, also being a mainly neuropsychological model, the same mapping 
of an implicit learning system to a dorsal processing pathway and an explicit learning system to a 
ventral pathway is proposed. A main difference is that the model of Keele and colleagues is based on 
the assumption that implicit sequence learning is learning of contingencies within dimensional 
modules. Thus, the model is not exclusive to motor skill learning; dimensions can, among other 
things, refer to visual contingencies (e.g. colors or shapes; each being one dimension), auditive 
contingencies (e.g. pitch or timbre) or motor contingencies (e.g. hand or feet movements). It should 
be noted that Keele et al. acknowledge that the term dimension is not perfectly defined in their 
theory and a clearer suggestion can be found in Eberhardt, Esser, and Haider (2017).  
Important to the theory of Keele et al. (2003) is that the dorsal, implicit learning system is 
exclusive to uni-dimensional learning. Information which is only correlated within one single 
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dimension will be learned without the need for any attentional supervision. It follows that multiple 
sequences can be learned in parallel as long as none of the sequences compete for processing in the 
same module and none of the sequences depends on processing its covariation with another 
sequence in a different modality (e.g. a color predicted by a shape). Uni-dimensional learning is 
assumed to result in so-called encapsulated information, which means that it does not interact with 
any other module and therefore will always remain implicit. There is no mechanism that can 
transform this implicitly learned information into explicit knowledge. The explicit learning system on 
the contrary is responsible for multi-dimensional learning. Whenever two or more sequences covary 
over different dimensions, it is necessary that selective attention is drawn towards the relation 
between the involved dimensions. Because attentional supervision is needed, there is no parallel 
learning within the explicit system. Nevertheless, learning in the multi-dimensional system is still 
seen as an automatic process in a way that it does not need the intention to learn. All that is needed 
is that the correlating dimensions, and no uncorrelated dimensions, are specified as relevant by the 
current task set. The supposed automaticity of the explicit learning system is reflected in the 
assumption that any learned knowledge within this system also is implicit at first. The only difference 
to the implicit system is that this knowledge can become explicit, conscious knowledge. Keele et al. 
remain silent on what the sufficient and necessary conditions are for multi-dimensional learning to 
become conscious; they only state that “because such events are attended, they are accessible to 
processes underlying awareness and thus (…) can become explicit” (Keele et al., 2003, p. 317). 
Interestingly, even though the model of Keele et al. is commonly known as a dual-system theory (and 
is also included as such within this work) it is, much like the model of Cleeremans (2011), rather a 
hybrid between one- and multiple-system views. Different from the model of Cleeremans, Keele et 
al. do not assume any dependency of the explicit on the implicit learning system and rather propose 
two completely independent systems. Nevertheless, the model by Keele et al. also assumes that 
implicit and explicit learning can arise from one and the same (multi-dimensional) system and that 
both systems are based on the same learning mechanism. 
All multiple-systems views, introduced so far, are very unspecific about the actual emergence 
of explicit sequence knowledge. They all are more oriented towards explaining how implicit learning 
can be realized and subsuming empirical findings under one unitary framework. They do not contain 
any references to theories of consciousness like the single-system view by Cleeremans and 
colleagues (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002) did and rather presume that conscious 
knowledge can result from implicit learning but do not describe how it develops. There are, however, 
multiple-system frameworks consciousness which are specifically designed to distinguish implicit and 
explicit learning mechanisms and which take scientific theories of consciousness into account. 
A first and very influential approach came from Dienes and Perner (1999) which is rooted in 
HOTTs. According to Dienes and Perner any representation can vary in their explicitness in three 
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hierarchical structured constituents; these are content, attitude, and holder. A representation is 
defined as a propositional attitude which at least needs an explicit content. When a person learns a 
sequence in an SRTT, they will acquire a first-order representation of the sequential structure. The 
person can explicitly represent the content of that proposition. That means that the person is aware 
of the given stimuli and their responses and might even express experiencing some feeling of fluency 
or familiarity. However, any propositional attitude can furthermore comprise an attitude towards 
this content (“knowing”, “imagining”, “wanting”, etc.) and lastly a holder (“I”). Dienes and Perner 
conceptualize implicit learning as being at least content explicit (more precisely as being property 
explicit as a further differentiation and most basic form of “content”; see Dienes & Perner, 1999) but 
attitude and holder implicit. However, for knowledge to become subjectively conscious (i.e. 
reportable sequence knowledge) the proposition also needs higher-order knowledge of the attitude 
(knowing that there is a sequence) and the holder (“it is I who knows that there is a sequence”). 
Important to the question how attitude and holder can become explicit, Dienes and Perner stated 
that observing one’s own behavior and inner experiences (e.g. the feeling of fluency) can lead to 
inferences of one’s own knowledge. These inferences constitute an explicit learning process that 
leads to a higher-order representation (i.e. attitude and holder explicitness) of one’s own knowledge.  
This conceptual framework of overserving one’s own behavior by Dienes and Perner (1999) 
provides the basis for the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (UEH) which has originally been proposed by 
Frensch et al. (2003). The UEH aims to improve the description of the mechanism behind the 
initiation of explicit learning processes. Most importantly, it aims to improve the explanation how 
and when implicit learning can trigger an explicit inferential process.  Concerning implicit learning 
processes, the UEH shares some assumptions with the models of Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002) as 
well as of Keele et al. (2003). Building on the computational stance on implicit learning, the UEH 
assumes that implicit learning is a byproduct of interacting with the environment. By repeatedly 
interacting with sequential information, associative weights will gain strength and implicit 
representations will develop. It is further assumed that this acquired knowledge is encapsulated 
within highly specialized subsystems. Unlike the model of Keele et al. implicit knowledge is not 
restricted to a dorsal processing path; instead, the modules which can acquire implicit knowledge are 
spread over different cortical and subcortical networks (see e.g. Conway & Pisoni, 2008; Gilbert, 
Sigman, & Crist, 2001, for overviews). For example implicit motor learning has often been associated 
with activity in the basal ganglia (see Karuza et al., 2013, for an overview), implicit visual learning has 
been found within the medial temporal lobe and the lateral and ventral occipital cortex (Rose, 
Haider, Salari, & Büchel, 2011; Rose, Haider, Weiller, & Büchel, 2002; Turk-Browne, Scholl, Chun, & 
Johnson, 2009) and auditory sequence learning within the primary auditive cortex (Kilgard & 
Merzenich, 2002). Similar to the model of Keele et al. (2003), it is postulated that implicitly acquired 
knowledge is unconscious due to its encapsulated nature and that there is no intrinsic conscious 
property to implicit knowledge, nor is there any additional mechanism that can transform it into 
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explicit knowledge. Unlike the account from Cleeremans (2011), explicit learning does not develop 
through the same learning mechanism as implicit learning and does not require the slow 
strengthening of metacognitive knowledge. Explicit sequence learning instead constitutes an 
independent mechanism that is based on hypothesis testing.  
The crucial idea of the UEH is that explicit sequence knowledge can only develop when a 
person unexpectedly notices a change in their own behavior. This can trigger an intentional search 
for the sequence. In an implicit learning situation, interaction with the task leads to continuous 
improvement of the responses to the stimuli; they become more accurate and faster. It can be this 
improvement or, for example, the feeling that the task becomes more fluent or easy, that there is a 
certain rhythm in one’s own responses or even an external event that directs the participant’s 
attention towards noticing an underlying pattern and triggers following search processes. These 
search processes do not necessarily lead to a detection of the sequence if another explanation seems 
more likely to account for the unexpected event (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. A schematic representation of the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., 2003). Any deviation 
between the expected and actual experience of a person constitutes an unexpected event. This comprises 
deviations from subjective, inner experiences (e.g. the feeling of fluency or knowing) as well as observable, 
external events (e.g. entering the correct response before target onset, constantly producing the same 
sequence of action-effects). The detection of an unexpected event leads to an explicit learning process which 
operates via hypothesis testing. Finding the hidden rule as the cause for the unexpected events leads to explicit 
rule knowledge, while finding another cause will hinder the development of explicit sequence knowledge.  
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Generally speaking, the UEH comprises a monitoring process which constantly compares 
expected and actual experiences. This comprises internal, experiential, as well as external, behavioral 
deviations from one’s expectation. This process allows detecting unexpected changes and initiates an 
attributional process for the detected conflict in order to adjust its predictions and reestablish 
coherence between the distant environment and one’s proximal model of it. Comparable 
monitoring-models have been established in neurocognitive models of conflict-detection and 
adaption (Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) metacognitive control 
(Kortiat, 2000, 2012, 2015), or memory (Whittlesea, 2002; Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). 
Importantly, this leads to two differences to the model of Cleeremans (2011). First, although 
both theories assume an indirect relation between implicit and explicit knowledge, in the UEH the 
quality of the implicit knowledge is less important for the acquisition of explicit knowledge. In the 
model of Cleeremans, the first-order system has to produce mostly correct responses before the 
higher-order system can learn that something has been learned by the first-order system. In the UEH, 
even though a strong implicit representation is also more likely to lead to an unexpected event (e.g. 
by experiencing more automaticity in one’s own responses), an unexpected event can happen at any 
point during the learning process nevertheless. Any hint for an underlying sequence, even very early 
during the learning phase, for example noticing that no key has to be pressed successively, can serve 
as an unexpected event. In this example, the explicit learning process is triggered completely 
independent of the representational quality first-order knowledge. The second important difference 
is that explicit knowledge does not develop on a gradual trial–by-trial basis. Instead, once a person 
starts searching for a reason for the unexpected event, detecting and learning the sequence explicitly 
will happen via a rather sudden insight-process. It will only take a few trials from the search for the 
sequence to the fully developed explicit representation of it.  
Concerning the compatibility with current views on consciousness, the UEH seems 
advantageous to the model of Keele et al. (2003). Multi-dimensional learning according to Keele et al. 
is a single process that starts with acquiring implicit representations which can develop into explicit 
representations. This implies that there is a certain network within the brain which is responsible for 
transforming unconscious into conscious representations. Even though Keele at al. add that attention 
is necessarily involved in multi-dimensional learning and that the ventral pathway processes 
categorized representations, this does not help to explain, in any way, why and how these 
representations can be conscious. Also, it is not defined if a difference between phenomenal and 
access consciousness is made. Without explaining which functions are related to explicit processing 
in their model, the ventral, multi-dimensional system creates a homunculus and it remains open at 
which point an implicit representation transforms into an explicit representation and how explicit 
representations differ from implicit ones.  
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The UEH instead is compatible with a functional framework of consciousness. There is no 
special mechanism or network that is supposed to be able to transform an implicitly learned 
representation into a conscious one. Neither is there an undefined gradual transition between 
unconscious and conscious states that leaves unspecified when exactly which functions of 
consciousness are enabled. Instead, the UEH can be positioned within a higher-order thought 
framework of consciousness as well as within a conceptualization of global availability of information. 
In its core, it assumes that consciousness requires learning that something has been learned. 
Concerning the HOTTs, the UEH proposes that sequence knowledge can only become explicit when a 
person has learned that they have learned something. Metacognition plays a major role in the UEH, 
as it assumes that there is no direct access to first-order knowledge; the only option to know that 
one knows (or not knows) is via observation of one’s own behavior and its coherence with the held 
beliefs and assumptions about one’s own first-order states. Furthermore, consciousness within the 
UEH is a dichotomous all-or-none state; once a representation is conscious, it is globally accessible to 
all functions of different networks.  
The UEH is also compatible with global workspace theories of consciousness. Once an explicit 
representation of a sequence has developed, there is not only a subjective state of knowing, it will 
also be available for verbal report, flexible and strategic use (e.g. inhibition, transfer to a new task), 
integration with associated knowledge or stimulus-independent, intentional use. Importantly, this 
does not mean that consciousness cannot differ in the detailedness of the features that are 
represented explicitly. As Dienes and Scott (2005) suggested, explicit knowledge can be judgmental 
or structural. A person can perceive an unexpected event within an implicit learning situation and 
assume that an underlying structure of the task is the reason for that change. Nevertheless, the 
sequence might, for example, be very complicated or the participant is simply not interested in 
finding out the actual sequence. In this case, the participant will possess conscious judgement 
knowledge; they know that there is a sequence, but they don’t know its exact structure. Another 
participant might detect the full sequence (or at least parts of it) and therefore will possess structural 
knowledge. Both participants can demonstrate all functions of consciousness about the exact 
features they are conscious about. The participants with judgmental knowledge can communicate 
that they know that there is a sequence or use this knowledge in a similar experiment in the future to 
start searching for a sequence from the beginning of the task. What they cannot do, for example, is 
intentionally producing the sequence in reverse order, when asked to do so. This would of course 
require explicit structural knowledge. Nevertheless, whether only judgmental or also structural 
explicit knowledge develops, is not dependent on the quality of the implicit representation but only 
on the explicit hypothesis testing process.  
To summarize, the core assumptions of the UEH are that (a) implicit learning influences 
behavior, (b) this behavioral change is detected and does not match the expected performance, (c) 
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this mismatch triggers a conscious attributional process, (d) this attributional process can lead to a 
detection of the sequence, and (e) the resulting explicit representation is a new representation, fully 
independent of the quality of the implicit representation and accessible to all functional networks.
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4 Empirical Evidence for Single- and Multiple-System Views 
Now that the theoretical outlines of single- and multiple-system views have been presented, it is 
important to take a look at the empirical evidence that supports each of these views. In order to 
understand the following experiments and their implications for the competing views, a short 
introduction into the methods of measuring implicit and explicit knowledge within the SRTT is 
necessary.  
Factoring that there is little consensus on the existence of unconscious knowledge and the 
nature of conscious knowledge, there is also a broad variety of methods for measuring both kinds of 
knowledge. What a test does measure and what the demands for a test of conscious knowledge are, 
is highly dependent on the conceptualization of consciousness. The following section will therefore 
give a short overview of the most common tests and their interpretation under different 
conceptualizations of consciousness.  
 
4.1 Measures for Implicit and Explicit Knowledge 
Whenever a participant is trained within an SRTT, they will show an incremental decrease in their 
reaction times (RT) to sequential stimuli compared to non-sequential stimuli (even though this is 
somewhat more complicated to show for non-motor sequences; Haider, Eberhardt, Kunde, & Rose, 
2012). This RT benefit is called an indirect test because it is merely a byproduct of task-performance. 
A direct test, which explicitly asks the participant to demonstrate what they have learned during 
training, is needed to identify whether their acquired knowledge is conscious or unconscious.  
The most intuitive and also most used method of choice among the direct tests is to simply 
ask the participant to name the sequence after the training. If they cannot recall the sequence and 
possibly also claim that they have not even noticed that there was a sequence, it could be assumed 
that the knowledge is unconscious. Whether verbal report has any informative value about the 
implicit or explicit nature of the knowledge has been extensively criticized and discussed. In their 
very well-known critique, Shanks and St John (1994) stated that in order to be able to show that 
knowledge is truly implicit, a direct test must fulfill two criterions: The information- and the 
sensitivity-criterion. The information-criterion requires that the direct test has to measure the exact 
same information that was responsible for the performance in the indirect test. Verbal report does 
not fulfill this criterion because it asks for more than what might be needed for a decrease in RT. 
Instead of being able to name the whole sequence, the participant might have noticed that no 
stimulus position is used successively or might simply know about single, salient transitions in the 
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task. Verbal report is therefore highly dependent on what the scientist considers to be important to 
ask for and asking for the wrong information (which might vary individually among the participants) 
might bias the participant and lead to an underestimation of explicit knowledge. The sensitivity 
criterion requires the direct test to be as sensitive as the indirect test. The test situation should 
ideally not differ from the training situation with the exception of the instructions and should 
motivate the participant to use any knowledge they have acquired during the training. Verbal report 
does not meet this criterion, either, because it creates a whole different recall situation and is less 
sensitive due to an unknown response-bias, motivation and expectation of the participant.   
Preferred by Shanks & Johnstone (1999) and already suggested by Nissen and Bullemer 
(1987) is the so-called generation task. Here, the participants are confronted with a task that has the 
exact same surface as the training task. The only difference is that sometimes the stimuli sequence 
will be interrupted and the participants are asked to enter the next response they consider to be the 
most likely on their own. Knowledge is said to be conscious if the participant gave more correct 
responses than was to be expected by mere guessing. In a similar vein, in a recognition test (Shanks & 
Johnstone, 1999) participants are tested in a task highly similar to the training situation. Here, they 
are confronted with trials in which the training sequence is presented and trials in which a new 
sequence is presented. It is then their task to rate whether a just presented sequence was “old” or 
“new”. Again, classification performance above chance-level is considered to demonstrate explicit 
knowledge.  
Besides various methodological criticism which is too broad to be discussed here (see, for 
example, Buchner, Steffens, Erdfelder, & Rothkegel, 1997; Jiménez, Méndez, & Cleeremans, 1996, on 
the generation- and the recognition task), there is one very profound methodological and one, 
maybe even more important, theoretical problem with these tasks. On the methodological side, the 
idealistic demand for a test that is process-pure for implicit or explicit knowledge has been criticized 
by Reingold and Merikle (1988). They stated that any behavior is always a product of conscious and 
unconscious processes. On the theoretical side, the search for the most sensitive measure has led to 
an operationalization of consciousness that is at odds with most functional accounts of 
consciousness. Making a correct predictive response might as well be the product of unconscious 
processes as it does not show that there is any subjective consciousness nor does it show that the 
knowledge can be used in any strategic way. These functions of consciousness cannot be assessed if 
the test is identical to the training situation. 
To tackle the problem of process-pureness, Jacoby (1991) developed the process-
dissociation-procedure (PDP) which has been adapted to the SRTT by Destrebecqz and Cleeremans 
(2001). It is the aim of the PDP to estimate the relative contributions of implicit and explicit 
knowledge on task performance. In the PDP, the participants face two intra-individual test conditions 
which both are highly similar to the training condition. Participants respond to the same sequence as 
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during training, but sometimes, no stimulus is presented and they are asked to give the response 
they consider to be the most likely to occur next (inclusion condition; similar to the generation task). 
It is assumed that explicit and implicit knowledge contributes to the performance within the inclusion 
condition. On other trials, they are asked to give the response they consider to be most unlikely to 
occur next (exclusion condition). Here, it is assumed that implicit and explicit knowledge work 
antagonistically. Implicit knowledge will lead to sequence-conform responses (intrusion errors) while 
only explicit knowledge can be controlled in a way that sequence conform responses can be avoided. 
A high proportion of correct inclusion responses together with a low proportion of intrusion errors is 
supposed to be an indicator of explicit knowledge. The PDP can meet the information criterion to a 
high extent because the inclusion- and exclusion condition only differ from the training task in their 
instructions. At the same it is compatible with functional theories of consciousness like the GWT 
because it asks for strategic use of the knowledge during the exclusion condition. However, it should 
be noted that Barth, Stahl, and Haider (2016) demonstrated that a core assumption of the PDP, 
namely the invariance of implicit and explicit processes across inclusion and exclusion conditions, 
may be violated within the SRTT paradigm and therefore yield unreliable measures.  
Moreover, the PDP still suffers from the shortcoming that it does not inform us about the 
subjective state of the participant. Dienes and Perner (1999) therefore asked for a test that combines 
objective and subjective performance while at the same time, it should try to meet the information 
and the sensitivity criterion to a high extent. In implicit learning research, an appropriate procedure 
has been suggested by Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey (2007) and adapted for the SRTT by Haider, 
Eichler, and Lange (2011). In the so-called wager task, the test task is constructed similar to the 
training task. Analogous to the generation task, participants are instructed to give the response they 
consider to be the next correct one whenever the task is interrupted and no target stimulus is shown. 
Right after their response, they are asked to rate their subjective confidence by wagering on their 
response. For example, they are instructed to bet 1 Cent or 50 Cent on the correctness of their 
response, reflecting their respective confidence. According to the zero-correlation criterion, implicit 
knowledge is assumed when a participant shows an amount of correct responses that is above 
chance-level while at the same time being unable to accurately rate the correctness of their 
responses. Overall, due to the high similarity between training and test, the wager task provides a 
highly sensitive task for measuring implicit and explicit knowledge. In addition, due to the wager 
component, it is also compatible with current functional theories of consciousness as the GWT as it 
tests for the ability to use one’s knowledge strategically. Moreover, the wager task is also satisfying 
from a HOTT perspective because it also captures the subjective aspect of sequence knowledge by 
including the confidence rating. Today, the wager task is a widely accepted measure for explicit 
knowledge within implicit learning research and also has been the subject of various methodological 
improvements (see e.g. Fleming & Lau, 2014; Massoni, Gajdos, & Vergnaud, 2014; Pasquali, 
Timmermans, Cleeremans, 2010; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010; ).  
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Lastly, it should be noted that Rünger and Frensch (2010) have made a strong theoretical 
argument for also continuing to use verbal report as an important measure for explicit sequence 
knowledge with respect to the GWT. They argue that not sensitivity but exclusivity is the most 
important criterion for a test of explicit sequence knowledge. According to their theoretical 
conception, sensitive tests tend to overestimate explicit knowledge; what is needed is a test that is 
impregnated against implicit knowledge and strongly exclusive to explicit knowledge. Verbal report 
would be the best candidate for such a test. In order to deal with the critique about verbal report 
being very susceptible to response-biases of the participants, Rünger and Frensch argue that these 
problems can be overcome by careful construction of the questionnaire. It should begin with very 
open questions and become increasingly specific, thereby motivating the participant to mention any 
knowledge they have while reducing insecurity (Eriksen, 1960).  
To summarize, the wager task as well as verbal report have been shown to be very valuable 
measures of explicit sequence knowledge and together are the most commonly used methods in 
implicit learning research. Moreover, Haider et al. (2011) have shown that both measures are 
correlated to a very high extent, making a final decision of one method over the other superfluous 
for the current research questions presented in the following studies.   
 
4.2 Empirical Evidence for Single-System Views 
As introduced in Chapter 3.1, single-system views can differ crucially on whether they assume that 
there are distinct types of acquired knowledge (i.e. implicit and explicit) within an SRTT. According to 
Shanks and colleagues (Shanks, 2005; Shanks & Perruchet, 2002), it has yet to be shown that 
performance in an SRTT is influenced by implicit knowledge. Their argument is mainly a 
methodological one. Any difference shown between an indirect and a direct test, which would be 
necessary to demonstrate dissociable learning systems, can be explained by the tests being unequal 
in their information- and sensitivity criteria. Different transformation processes are needed when a 
learned representation facilitates the response within an SRTT or when the participant is asked to, 
for example, verbally report the sequence. To support their single-system view, Shanks and 
Colleagues use recognition (Shanks & Johnstone, 1999) or generation tasks (Speekenbrink, Channon, 
& Shanks, 2008). Employing these highly sensitive tasks, the authors show that there is no 
performance difference between the direct test and the indirect test. It is therefore argued that 
knowledge acquired within an SRTT (and other tasks that are supposed to demonstrate unconscious 
processes) is accessible to the participants. However, as discussed in Chapter 4.1 these kind of direct 
tests do not fit the functional approaches to consciousness very well. There is neither any criterion 
showing that the participants have any kind of subjective experience of being conscious of that 
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knowledge, nor is any higher, strategic cognitive function required by those tasks. For that reason, 
the discussion of these studies on single-system explanations is not further extended within this 
work.  
Of higher interest are the studies by Cleeremans and colleagues (Cleeremans, Timmermans, 
& Pasquali, 2007; Pasquali et al., 2010). They assume that implicit and explicit knowledge can be 
dissociated but that both forms of knowledge arise from the same learning process, which is mainly 
dependent on the strengthening of associations throughout practice. Importantly, their work 
includes direct tests, like the wager-task, which are more congruent with the discussed functional 
theories of consciousness. In their studies, artificial neural networks following the metacognitive 
learning architecture suggested by Cleeremans (2008; 2011, see Chapter 3.1), are modeled. 
Cleeremans et al. (2007) trained a first-order feedforward network to learn a simple digit 
discrimination task (i.e. discriminating which number from 0-9 served as an input to the network). 
The input network consisted of input, hidden, and output units. The activation pattern of the hidden 
units was copied into a second input-layer of an independent higher-order feedforward network. 
These input units were again connected to a hidden layer of the higher-order network which, in turn, 
was connected to output units, representing the judgement of the higher-order network about the 
correctness of the output of the first-order network. This certainty could be expressed in a “high 
wager” if the higher-order network decided that the output was correct, or in a “low wager” if it 
decided that the output was incorrect. The first-order network gradually learned to improve the 
digit-classification. The higher-order network showed a different, u-shaped, learning curve. It started 
with a fairly good performance (i.e. high wagers on correct outputs of the first-order network and 
low wagers on wrong outputs), then dropped to chance-level and gradually improved again until it 
reached 100% correct responses. This can be explained by the performance of the first-order 
network. The first-order network starts with a very bad classification performance; the second-order 
network learns that the first-order network is almost always wrong and accordingly correctly puts 
low wagers on the correctness of the first-order network. When the first-order network surpasses 
chance-level, the second-order network’s performance will drop until it has learned that the state of 
the first-order network has changed and thereby begins to place high wagers on correct outputs.  
In a subsequent study, Pasquali et al. (2010) aimed to compare the results produced by their 
network to data produced by participants in an implicit learning situation. Therefore, they used the 
data of Persaud et al. (2007) with which the wager-task has been introduced as a measure of 
subjective consciousness within an Iowa Gambling task (Bechara, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), 
blindsight (Stoering, Zontanou, & Cowey, 2002) and Artificial Grammar Learning (A. Reber, 1967). The 
network built by Pasquali et al. (2010) replicated the participants’ data on all three tasks. Together 
these studies show, on a computational level, that metacognitive learning can be used to explain the 
dissociation between performance in indirect and direct tests in an implicit learning situation.  
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Besides the studies led by Shanks and colleagues, in which tests of ambiguous informative 
value have been used to assess explicit sequence knowledge and the simulation data of Cleeremans 
and colleagues, hardly any studies supporting a single-system view on the emergence of explicit 
knowledge in an implicit learning situation can be found.  
 
4.3 Empirical Evidence for Multiple-System Views 
Corresponding to the larger number of multiple-system views, there is also much more research 
dedicated to investigating them. This comprises modeling of neural networks which propose 
different learning mechanisms and representational formats for implicit and explicit knowledge (e.g. 
the CLARION model by Sun, Slusarz, and Terry, 2005; the TELECAST model by Hélie, Proulx, and 
Lefebvre, 2011). Concerning the question of potentially dissociable neural bases of implicit and 
explicit learning, there are neuropsychological studies on amnestic patients showing the involvement 
of different networks within an SRTT. These studies generally point to the circumstance that 
amnestic patients with heavily impaired declarative memory due to damage in the medial temporal 
lobe (MTL) show an inability to explicitly learn a sequence within an SRTT. Nevertheless, the implicit 
learning skills of these patients are comparable to healthy control groups (P. Reber & Squire, 1998; 
Vandenberghe, Schmidt, Fery, & Cleeremans, 2006; but see Speekenbrink et al., 2008, for a different 
view). There also are neurological studies with healthy participants pointing to a possible 
neurological dissociation between explicit and implicit learning systems. These studies usually 
demonstrate an association between increased activation within the MTL, generally characterized as 
an important network for declarative knowledge, and explicit sequence learning (Keele et al. 2003; 
Poldrack et al., 2001; P. Reber, 2013), even though MTL activity has also been demonstrated for 
implicit non-motor sequence learning (Rose et al., 2011; Rose et al., 2002; Turk-Browne, 2009). 
Furthermore, activity within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the parieto-occipital, the premotor 
and inferior temporal cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex, subsumed by Keele at al. (2003) as 
the ventral stream, has been associated with explicit sequence learning (Destrebecqz et al. 2003; 
Grafton, Hazeltine, & Ivry, 1995; Hazeltine, Grafton, & Ivry, 1997). More specifically, the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum showed increased coupling of their activity shortly before 
participants indicated awareness of the implicitly learned sequence (Rose, Haider, & Büchel, 2010; 
Wessel, Haider, & Rose, 2012). These latter studies provide interesting support for the role of the 
detection of unexpected events in the acquisition of explicit knowledge because the investigated 
network has been associated with feedback-based prediction learning and the implicit detection of 
violations from learned associations (Rose, Haider, & Büchel, 2005; Seger, 2008). 
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In congruence with the assumption that implicit learning can be found for various distinct 
response- and stimulus dimensions and that this learning happens within encapsulated modules 
(Eberhardt et al., 2017; Keele et al., 2003), implicit learning can be found in widespread subsystems 
within the brain. Thereby, the most robust finding is the involvement of the basal ganglia as long as 
motor sequences are involved (Karuza et al., 2013) whereas the much less investigated non-motor 
visual learning has been associated with activation in the lateral and ventral occipital cortex, the 
posterior caudate and the MTL (see P. Reber, 2013, for an overview; Rose et al., 2011).  
Showing that different neural networks are involved in explicit and implicit learning might be 
seen as a hint towards different learning mechanisms being involved. However, given the multitude 
of multiple-system views as well as the huge variability in the actual experimental designs and the 
exact structure of the sequences involved, the neuroimaging data are far from being able to support 
any specific theoretical view on the mechanism behind the emergence from explicit knowledge in an 
implicit learning situation. More interesting are studies directly aimed at differentiating between 
single- and multiple-system views. There are a few experiments directly focused at testing 
parsimonious single-system accounts against the assumption that additional explicit learning 
mechanisms are needed to gain insight over encapsulated implicit knowledge.  
The earliest study directly aimed at this question came from Haider and Frensch (2005). In 
this study the authors worked with a number reduction task (NRT; Frensch et al., 2003; Thurstone & 
Thurstone, 1941) instead of an SRTT. In the NRT, participants compare two digits and respond to 
them being identical or not identical. Like in the SRTT, there is an underlying hidden rule which is 
more abstract in the NRT. Despite these differences, both paradigms have in common a typical 
decrease in reaction times when the hidden rule is learned implicitly. In this study the authors tested 
a crucial prediction of the UEH: Unexpected events should trigger an attributional process that leads 
to explicit rule knowledge. More precisely, they programmed unexpected events into the task by 
having the program erroneously record a premature response, i.e. a response made before the 
target stimulus appeared. The participants were made to believe that they were responsible for the 
premature responses. It was manipulated whether the instructions gave the participants a sufficient 
explanation for these responses happening (i.e. attentional lapses), while the other group was given 
no explanation. The idea was that only participants without a given explanation would look for a 
reason for their erroneous behavior and therefore would have a higher likelihood to detect the 
hidden sequence. However, the results were not completely unequivocal. The group that was not 
offered a cause for their premature responses did show more explicit knowledge than a control 
condition without any premature responses inserted.  At the same time, the group that did have a 
cause offered did not differ from that control group. Still, the groups with and without an offered 
cause for their premature responses only differed numerically but not significantly from each other. 
This might have been due to the problem that the offered cause (i.e. attentional lapses) did not 
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necessarily prevent participants from wondering how they were able to give a correct response 
before the target stimulus was even shown. Therefore, there still might have been a substantial, 
though smaller, proportion of participants that were surprised by the unexpected event and 
searched for a cause outside of the simple explanation of inattention.  
In another NRT study, Haider and Frensch (2009) manipulated the chance to experience 
unexpected events produced by the participants themselves. Here, the authors manipulated the 
response-stimulus interval (RSI); there either was a 500ms delay before the next stimulus was 
presented after the last response or it followed 250ms after the last response. Their assumption was 
that a long RSI would raise the likelihood for premature responses, while an RSI of 250 ms would 
make them less likely. The UEH therefore predicts an increase in the amount of explicit knowledge 
for the group with a 500 ms RSI. The results corresponded with this prediction. Because the amount 
of practice was equal between the conditions, it seems that the results are in favor of the UEH and 
against a simpler single-system view. However, there also was a significant performance difference 
between the 500 ms and the 250 ms RSI condition, with the 500 ms Condition showing shorter RTs. 
This might of course, in accordance with the UEH, be an effect of the increase in explicit knowledge 
due to the increased amount of unexpected events. But it might also be a sign that the 500 ms RSI 
condition learned more about the sequence, which, in accordance with a single-system view, 
gradually led to more explicit knowledge. In fact, Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001, 2003) argued 
that a longer RSI provides more opportunities to associate memory traces of high quality and thereby 
to develop higher quality representations. In a computational model they assume that there is a 
perception network which can produce motor responses and an additional memory network that can 
interact with the perception- and the motor network and learn about the sequence, but only if given 
enough time (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). When the RSI is short, there is less chance that 
memory representations can develop. Even though this explanation has later been disputed by 
Rünger (2012), it is necessary to manipulate unexpected events in diverse other ways to strengthen 
the UEH explanation behind these data.  
Such a different way of manipulating unexpected events, this time within the SRTT paradigm, 
has been explored by Rünger and Frensch (2008) as well as by Schwager, Rünger, Gaschler, and 
Frensch (2012). Rünger and Frensch (2008) manipulated whether the SRTT training contained only 
regular trials (control group) or was interrupted by either a new sequence or by random trials. Their 
assumption was that the interruption by a new sequence or by random trials would lead to an 
increase in RT, which the participants could notice as an unexpected event. Therefore, the groups 
who received additional random trials or trials with a new sequence should develop more explicit 
sequence knowledge. The amount of trials with the actual training sequence was kept constant 
across all groups. Therefore, the representational strength was supposed to be kept equal across the 
three conditions, implying no difference would be expected by single-system views. However, the 
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authors did not find the expected advantage for any of the experimental groups. They only found less 
participants without any verbalizable knowledge in the condition which sometimes was interrupted 
by a new sequence.  
Schwager et al. (2012) chose a similar approach. Here, participants were trained with either 
random material or with regular material. In a subsequent manipulation phase, they either received 
the same regular sequence as during training or a new regular sequence. Single-system views would 
predict that the group who had the same sequence during training and the manipulation phase 
should show the most explicit knowledge. If however, the change to a new sequence is perceived as 
an unexpected event, for example by recognizing an increase in the RT, this should, according to the 
UEH, lead to more explicit knowledge. Again, the results did not completely match the predictions. 
The group with the regular training and the new sequence in the manipulation phase did not show 
more explicit knowledge than the group who received the same sequence in both phases. Only the 
group with random training showed less explicit knowledge than the two groups who were trained 
with a sequence. Nevertheless, it remains an interesting point that from the two groups who 
received the new sequence in the manipulation phase, those participants who had already had a 
different sequence during training had more explicit knowledge of the new sequence than the 
control group who had had no former sequence. Both groups therefore had the same amount of 
practice with the new sequence in the manipulation phase. This result however is not unambiguously 
diagnostic about either a single-system approach or the UEH. It is not a clear prediction of the UEH 
that the group trained with random material before showed less knowledge than the group who had 
already received a different sequence. Eventually, the random group might as well be expected to 
perceive a salient unexpected event, as they changed from more difficult random material to an 
increasingly fluently-feeling sequential structure. A single-system account might explain the finding 
when strengthening of the training sequence led to explicit knowledge of the training sequence. It is 
trivial that a group who has learned that there is a sequence in the training would also search for the 
new sequence in the manipulation phase.  
The studies discussed so far focus on the core assumption of the UEH, namely that there is a 
causal relation between experiencing an unexpected event and the emergence of explicit knowledge. 
There is another row of experiments which also should briefly be mentioned here because they focus 
on another important assumption that separates the UEH from single-system accounts. The following 
studies focus on the sudden transition from implicit to explicit knowledge by converging behavioral 
with neuroimaging data. A sudden insight emerging from hypothesis testing is opposed to single-
system views which all assume a slow and gradual transition. A first investigation has been reported 
by Haider and Rose (2007). They showed that participants who were able to verbally report a 
sequence at the end of training showed differences in their RT performance compared to 
participants whose knowledge remained implicit. While the latter showed a typical gradual decrease 
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in their RT, participants who had developed explicit knowledge showed a distinctive, sudden drop in 
their RTs which is likely to reflect the moment a participant was able to switch from stimulus- to 
plan-driven control. This finding was more thoroughly investigated in a study by Rose et al. (2010). 
Here the concurrence between an RT drop during training and the subsequently tested ability to 
name the rule was further established. Moreover, the authors could show that a clear change in 
neural activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum preceded this RT drop. 
This cortico-subcortical network has previously been associated with expected value and the 
representation of prediction errors (see e.g. Chase, Kumar, Eickhoff, & Dombrovski, 2015, for a meta-
analysis). In the context of the UEH an increase in activity in these regions might thus affirm the 
assumption that an unexpected violation of  predictions is relevant for triggering explicit learning 
processes which soon after lead to a drop in the participant’s RTs. Furthermore, both studies support 
the assumption of a sudden insight which leads to a qualitative change in information processing, 
rather than a gradual transition towards conscious knowledge.  
Another interesting finding in that context came from Schuck et al. (2015). Here, the authors 
did not use an SRTT, but a similar task where participants were instructed to perform a simple 
discrimination task which, unbeknownst to the participants, contained a visual sequence that, if 
discovered, would allow a simpler task processing. Increased activation of the medial prefrontal 
cortex was associated with the exploration of color information that could be used for a strategy 
shift. This signal predicted which participants would show a strategy shift a few minutes later. This is 
one of the first studies to show that an active exploration of the task material, as it is proposed by 
the UEH, precedes the insight into an implicitly learned rule. Taken together, the results presented 
here all show very interesting, converging and diverse evidence that unexpected events are an 
important trigger for attributional processes which in turn can lead to explicit learning of an implicitly 
learned sequence. It is the aim of the following studies to build on these findings. The studies are 
designed to improve some of the issues discussed about the just presented studies. Furthermore, 
since the UEH is a very broad framework that allows many different opportunities to experience 
unexpected events and should account for different forms of implicit learning, the following 
experiments should also broaden the methodological horizon of manipulations within an implicit 
learning situation.  
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5 Overview of the Studies 
Three studies were conducted with the aim of providing further insight into the mechanisms behind 
the emergence of explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation. More specifically, all three 
studies were aimed at testing a parsimonious single-system strengthening account against a multi-
system account represented by the UEH. 
The first study was methodologically close to the studies of Rünger & Frensch (2008) and 
Schwager et al. (2012) presented in the former chapter. Its main aim was to manipulate the 
subjective feeling of fluency as an unexpected event between the participants, while also trying to 
find some methodological improvements to these studies.  
Studies 2 and 3 took a different approach to investigating the assumptions of the UEH. In 
these studies we investigated the role of action-effect learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010, for a review) which, in 
previous studies has repeatedly been linked to learning within the SRTT (Stöcker & Hoffmann, 2004; 
Tubau, López-Moliner, & Hommel, 2007; Ziessler, 1998). Moreover, various studies showed 
increased explicit sequence learning when action-effect learning was involved (Hoffmann, Sebald, & 
Stöcker, 2001; Stöcker, Sebald, & Hoffmann, 2003; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2001; Zirngibl & Koch, 
2002). However, there has not been a direct investigation of the role of action-effect learning on 
explicit sequence knowledge so far. Therefore, studies 2 and 3 were designed to fortify this empirical 
evidence and also apply the UEH as an explanatory framework for these effects.  
 
5.1 Study 1: The Emergence of Explicit Knowledge in a Serial Reaction Time 
Task: The Role of Experienced Fluency and Strength of Representation 
 
The goal of Study 1 was to directly test the role of associative strength against the role of unexpected 
events on the emergence of explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation. As discussed in 
Chapter 4.3 there only have been a few studies that directly tried to test these theories against each 
other. So far, these studies yielded some interesting insights by trying out various manipulations to 
keep the associative strength equal across the different conditions, while at the same time trying to 
manipulate the likelihood of unexpected events and the possible causal attributions for them. Taken 
together, these studies provide converging support for the UEH. However, individually they also 
showed that the manipulation of the relevant factors can become very tricky and that the paradigm 
as well as the complex research question at hand needs a multifaceted approach to deal with various 
unwanted side-effects and alternative explanations. The following study built on the logic of the 
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studies from Haider and Frensch (2005, 2009), as well as the studies from Rünger and Frensch (2008) 
and Schwager et al. (2012) by trying to deal with the challenges these studies encountered.  
The current study and all following ones used the SRTT paradigm, instead of the NRT, 
because it allows for a much broader variability of the sequences used and also has a big advantage 
through the great amount of research behind it. This in turn opens up a broader spectrum of 
accepted tests of knowledge. The essential studies by Haider and Frensch (2005, 2009), Rünger and 
Frensch (2008) and Schwager et al. (2012) all used verbal report of the sequence as the test for 
explicit knowledge. As discussed in Chapter 4.1 verbal report has its merits. Still, their results often 
did not show the expected differences and a more sensitive test might help to detect any differences 
in explicit knowledge more reliably. Therefore, in the current and all following studies we used the 
wager task (Haider et al., 2011) to estimate explicit knowledge.  
Furthermore, because the UEH allows many different sources for unexpected events, we 
aimed to augment the empirical basis by using a new manipulation for the occurrence of unexpected 
events. So far, the studies by Haider and Frensch (2005, 2009) mainly used externally determined 
events (i.e. premature responses inserted by the program) which the participants were supposed to 
perceive as self-produced. This was a very good way to ensure that all participants encountered the 
exact same training phase. However, the UEH assumes that implicit learning should lead to changes 
in one’s own behavior and that perceiving these changes leads to an attributional search process. For 
this reason, it would be helpful to find a manipulation that also covers the need to keep the training 
as comparable as possible while at the same time leading to different perceivable changes in one’s 
own behavior. Rünger and Frensch (2008; Experiments 2a & 2b) tried to achieve this by inserting 
random blocks into the training phase. This should lead to a perceivable and unexpected slowing of 
the responses, in turn leading to attributional search processes, compared to a group with the same 
amount of regular trials but without any random trials. Rünger and Frensch however did not find the 
predicted differences in explicit sequence knowledge. This might be because the random blocks were 
too long (120 trials) and participants’ search processes were not successful since they might have 
been triggered and started but also stopped again before the sequence had reappeared. Besides 
that, the results might also be in favor of a single-system strengthening account because participants, 
at least numerically, showed less sequence knowledge and slower RTs when trained with additionally 
inserted random blocks. It could be argued that inserting random blocks led to a weakening of the 
associative strength and therefore also to less sequence knowledge.  
In the following study, we tried to implement an improvement to the design of Rünger and 
Frensch which should tackle the just mentioned difficulties of their study. We aimed for a design that 
kept the amount of regular and irregular trials equal across all groups, therefore not allowing any 
differences in the associative strength. The critical manipulation was the arrangement of the regular 
and irregular trials. For one condition the regular and irregular trials were mixed randomly, while for 
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the other group both trial-types alternated every 22 (Experiment 1 & 2), respectively every 88 trials 
(Experiment 3). The expectation was that only the participants who encountered these alternating 
mini-blocks of 22, respectively 88 random and regular trials should be able to experience a difference 
in the experienced fluency between both types of material. Participants who were trained with both 
types of material mixed randomly should not be able to experience any differences in the fluency of 
the material because the material changes are too frequent. If the differences in the experienced 
fluency represent an unexpected event, the group who received the regular and irregular material in 
alternating mini-blocks should also show more explicit sequence knowledge.  
Another improvement lay in the composition of the three experiments in Study 1. The UEH 
postulates that there is no direct relation between implicit and explicit knowledge. To increase the 
informative value of our study, we aimed to show that the difference in the arrangement of the 
regular and irregular trials has an influence on the explicit knowledge acquisition, but does not lead 
to a difference in the acquired knowledge in general. Therefore, in Experiment 1 we tried to make 
the emergence of explicit knowledge highly unlikely by presenting one group rather short alternating 
mini-blocks (22 trials) of regular and irregular material compared to a group who received randomly 
mixed material. Our expectation was that these mini-blocks were too short to allow the participants 
to explicitly learn the sequence. Experiment 1 should therefore provide an estimation of the 
difference in acquired sequence knowledge that does not go back to explicit learning. Our 
manipulation of the arrangement of the training material should generally not lead to any 
differences in the knowledge base of both groups. However, because we also expected the different 
arrangements to lead to differences in the experienced feeling of fluency, differences in the 
performance during the training task could also be expected. Participants who alternatingly 
experienced more and less fluency during the mini-blocks might show greater differences in their RTs 
than participants who received the randomly mixed material, who might generally be a little slower 
on both types of material. We used the wager task as a very handy option to estimate the acquired 
knowledge without resorting to RTs.  
In a second step we directly aimed to test whether our manipulation led to the predicted 
subjective differences in experienced fluency of the training material (Experiment 2). This direct 
assessment of the subjective metacognitive attitudes towards the training material is a new, 
explorative approach to test the assumptions of the UEH. So far, the anteceding studies have only 
tried to ensure their manipulation affected the subjective perception of the participants’ behavior by 
retrospectively asking them about what they perceived. Here, we tried to implement a more 
sensitive measure of the subjects’ experiences by letting them rate their experienced differences in 
the fluency of the regular and irregular material within the SRTT itself. The group who received the 
regular and irregular material arranged in mini-blocks should rate the regular material as feeling 
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more fluent than the irregular one, while the group who received both materials mixed randomly 
should not be able to rate one material as feeling more fluent than the other.  
Finally, in a last step, we extended the length of the mini-blocks of regular and irregular 
material to 88 trials per mini-block. This should, opposed to the shorter 22 trial mini-blocks, allow the 
group that is trained with this blocked material to find a sequence, if in fact the difference in the 
experienced fluency triggers subsequent search processes. Therefore, Experiment 3 aimed to show 
that the group that wa trained with such longer alternating mini-blocks of regular and irregular 
material should acquire more explicit knowledge than the group that received both types of training 
material mixed randomly.  
All three experiments taken together provided a clear, gradual deduction of the assumptions 
of the UEH. Experiment 1 showed that our manipulation of the subjective feelings of fluency did not 
lead to a different amount of acquired (implicit) knowledge, expressed in a subsequent wager task. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that the manipulation of the trial-type arrangement did lead to 
differences in the experienced fluency. Lastly, Experiment 3 showed that the manipulation of the 
experienced fluency did lead to differences in explicit knowledge. More explicit knowledge was 
found for participants who could perceive a difference in the fluency between regular and irregular 
trials due to the blocked arrangement of these trial-types. Together the studies can show that the 
same underlying implicit knowledge base can result in different consciously perceivable changes of 
behavior and that it is this subjectively experienced, unexpected change that leads to an explicit 
search for the reason of this experience. This search ultimately can lead to explicit sequence 
knowledge.    
 
5.2 Study 2: Implicit Visual Learning: How the Task Set Modulates Learning by 
Determining the Stimulus-Response Binding 
 
The main goal of study 2 was to investigate the role of response-effect learning (R-E learning) on the 
emergence of explicit sequence knowledge. R-E learning is generally considered to be an important 
mechanism for intentional action control, as opposed to habitual or stimulus-dependent behavior 
(Hommel et al., 2001; Shin et al.; 2010; Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010). Hence, it might not be surprising 
that several studies have found a relation between R-E learning and the emergence of explicit 
sequence learning in an implicit learning situation (Hoffmann, Sebald, & Stöcker, 2001; Stöcker, 
Sebald, & Hoffmann, 2003; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2001; Zirngibl & Koch, 2002). Yet, most of these 
studies rather considered R-E learning as a general mechanism guiding implicit sequence learning 
and which is comparable to R-R, S-S or S-R learning (e.g. Ziessler, 1998). Only a few studies have 
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given the finding of an increase in explicit sequence knowledge special consideration. For example, 
Stöcker & Hoffmann (2004) suggested that auditive action effects lead to chunking processes that 
integrate these auditive effects into a melody and that it is these chunking mechanisms that promote 
the emergence of explicit knowledge. Similarly, Tubau et al. (2007) argued that auditive action-
effects are integrated into a melody through the phonological loop. Because the phonological loop 
also plays an important role in plan-guided behavior, auditive action effects might promote plan-
guided, as opposed to stimulus-guided behavior in an implicit learning task. The assumption that 
integrating action-effects into a higher-order structure (i.e. chunks) leads to explicit knowledge 
resembles a single-system account of explicit learning.  However, the integration of a sequence into 
chunks might also be the effect of and not the cause for explicit sequence knowledge. The UEH 
provides an alternative explanation for the observation of an increase in explicit sequence 
knowledge. The essential link between the UEH and R-E learning is that both crucially depend on the 
perception of distal changes in the environment brought upon by one’s own behavior. Different 
research points to the circumstance that R-E associations will only be acquired when the effects in 
the environment are interpreted as being caused by one’s own actions (Herwig & Waszak, 2009, 
2012). It has furthermore been shown that acquiring an action-effect association leads to the 
conscious anticipation of the effect before the action is initiated (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; 
Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Moore & Haggard, 2008). It is this conscious anticipation of an action-
effect that enables it to control intentional behavior (Hommel et al., 2001; 2017). Integrating the 
research in R-E learning into the UEH leads to the idea that learning R-E relations within an SRTT has 
a much greater likelihood to lead to perceivable changes in one’s own behavior than learning about 
R-R, S-S or S-R relations. The latter three mostly lead to responses becoming faster and making fewer 
errors, which, if noticed at all, both can easily be attributed to mere practice effects. Different from 
that, experiencing that an action contingently leads to the same perceivable change in the 
environment, or even to a whole sequence of perceivable events, is a very salient unexpected event 
that points towards the existing of an underlying sequence – especially if these effects slowly start to 
be actively anticipated. 
The following study was a first try to provide further evidence for the role of R-E learning in 
the emergence of explicit sequence knowledge. In their design, the experiments were built on a 
study by Haider et al. (2012). In this study, the authors used a very subtle manipulation to affect the 
stimulus-response mapping. Participants either responded to stimuli with the keyboard, as in the 
usual SRTT setting, or responded via mouse by clicking on the response stimuli displayed on the 
screen. Additionally, it was manipulated whether there was a pure visual sequence (i.e. in the colors 
of the target stimuli without any sequential motor responses) or a pure motor sequence (i.e. with 
random target colors) which the participants responded to. The interesting finding was that implicit 
learning seemed to be unaffected by the response device, but explicit learning critically depended on 
the combination of response device and sequence type. While the motor sequence was learned 
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explicitly with the mouse as well as with the keyboard, only the participants who responded with the 
mouse were able to acquire explicit knowledge about the visual sequence. These results were 
tentatively explained with an R-E learning mechanism. The assumption was that if participants 
respond with the keyboard they encode mainly information about the location of the response. 
Responding with the mouse instead leads to encoding of both the color and the location of the 
clicked response stimulus on the screen. Therefore, when trained with a motor sequence, all 
participants can experience a contingent association between their response (coded by its location) 
and the outcome, i.e. the next stimulus location.  This enhanced explicit learning for keyboard- and 
mouse-conditions. When the participants were trained with a visual sequence instead, only the ones 
who responded with the mouse, and thereby coded their response by the to-be-selected color, 
experienced a contingent response-outcome relation (i.e. the outcome being the next target’s color). 
Hence, only the mouse-condition showed an increase in explicit knowledge about the visual 
sequence. 
In the following three experiments, the first one represented a replication of the finding of 
Haider et al. (2012). In the second experiment, we aimed to fortify the assumption that participants 
who respond with a keyboard do not encode the visual characteristics of the target-, respectively 
response stimuli (or to a much lesser extent) but rather encode the relevant response locations. To 
test this, we only trained participants with a visual sequence this time. Again, the participants either 
responded with mouse or keyboard. Additionally, we introduced tones which were either bound to 
the colors of the response stimuli or to the response locations. Consequently, only when the tones 
were bound to the colors, the participants produced a melody with their responses, independent of 
whether they responded with the keyboard or the mouse. Should the fact that participants created a 
melody with their responses lead to more explicit sequence knowledge in both response device 
conditions, this could be taken as evidence for the assumptions put forward by Stöcker and 
Hoffmann (2004) or Tubau et al. (2007). If however, the contingent color-tone relation only leads to 
more explicit knowledge in the mouse condition, this could be taken as evidence that the mouse 
condition indeed encoded the colors of the response stimuli to a greater extent. Additionally, this 
could be taken as a further hint that experiencing a contingent relation between a response (here 
coded by colors) and the subsequent effects of this response (the next color and the contingent tone) 
are relevant for the emergence of explicit sequence knowledge. Finally, the third experiment should 
provide more evidence for our proposal that experiencing contingent R-E relations specifically 
impacts explicit sequence learning. In order to test this, participants again were trained with a visual 
sequence and responded either with the mouse or with the keyboard. This time, no additional tones 
were used. Additionally, 50% random trials were interspersed in the training sequence. This should 
hinder the acquisition of explicit knowledge. Two control groups received the same response device 
manipulation, but were trained with 100% regular trials. In line with the former experiments, we 
expected to find explicit knowledge in the mouse control group with 100% regular trials. The 
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interesting comparison to distinguish between a single-system strengthening account and an R-E 
account was the comparison between the two 50% random trials experimental groups. Due to the 
random trials inhibiting the acquisition of explicit knowledge, the relevant comparison was in the 
acquired sequence knowledge per se (i.e. percent correct responses in the wager task). 
If we found more sequence knowledge per se for the experimental group trained with 50% 
random material while using the mouse as a response device compared to the keyboard 
experimental condition, this would speak for a single-system strengthening account. It could be 
interpreted that the manipulation of the response device affects attention to the relevant dimension 
(i.e. stimulus color), so that the mouse-condition acquires stronger associations and therefore also 
can develop more explicit knowledge. If however, both conditions that were trained with 50% 
random material showed a comparable amount of knowledge, this would make a point against an 
interpretation based on the gradual increase of associative strength. We hypothesized that the 
difference in sequence knowledge between response devices would be specific to the acquisition of 
explicit knowledge, not associative strength per se. If R-E learning specifically affects the acquisition 
of explicit knowledge, there should not be a difference between the two experimental conditions 
because the 50% percent random trials impede these explicit learning processes.    
The second study brought important further evidence for a special role of R-E learning in the 
emergence of explicit sequence knowledge. Experiment 1 replicated the findings of Haider et al. 
(2012) and Experiment 2 fortified the R-E learning explanation for these findings. More explicit 
knowledge was found when action-effect tones were bound contingently to the participant’s 
responses coded in the relevant dimension. Experiment 3 showed that action-effects seemed to 
selectively enhance explicit but not implicit learning processes. 
 
5.3 Study 3: Action-Effects Enhance Explicit Sequential Learning 
Study 3 served to further explore the relationship between R-E learning and explicit sequence 
knowledge by ruling out some of the alternative explanations left open by study 2. Concerning the 
results of study 2, it might still be possible to explain them with a strengthening account even if 
Experiment 3 provided results which at least would require some additional assumptions. If 
participants trained with a visual sequence either coded their actions by location (in the keyboard 
condition) or by location and color (in the mouse condition), only the latter group experienced a 
contingent relation between the color they responded to and the next target color. This can be 
interpreted as a simple strengthening of S-S associations, without the need to assume that 
participants interpreted the next color or the tone as an effect of their actions. Additionally adding a 
tone to an S-S sequence adds another predictive dimension to that S-S relation so that accordingly, 
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the quality of the representation can improve even further. In Experiment 3 of Study 2, the mouse 
condition which received 50% random trials did not show more significant explicit knowledge. It 
could be argued that the added noise from the random trials made learning so difficult that both the 
keyboard condition and the mouse condition only learned very little about the visual sequence at all 
and that it would have taken many more trials until the knowledge advantage for the mouse 
condition could have developed. This view might be supported by the fact that while none of the two 
experimental conditions showed an advantage in explicit knowledge, there was a numerical trend for 
the mouse condition to give more percent correct responses in the wager task. If, with more training, 
this trend became a significant difference, it would oppose the assumption that experiencing 
contingent R-E relations specifically impacts explicit sequence learning but not sequence learning per 
se. 
To rule out these explanations with Study 3, we developed an experiment with a related but 
different design which manipulated (a) the contingency of the responses and the effects and (b) the 
interpretation of the additional effect-tones as either being an additional but response-independent 
stimulus event or as an effect of one’s own actions. The most obvious difference was that the 
comparison between two response devices was no longer the manipulation of choice.  
Concerning the contingency of the responses and their effects, the experiment in Study 3 
created a situation where all participants responded with the keyboard to a motor sequence. There 
was an additional and uncorrelated color sequence in the stimuli which was irrelevant for all groups. 
Hence, differently to Study 2, there was no difference in the dimensions the participants were 
induced to pay attention to. In one condition of Study 3, participants had a tone contingently bound 
to each response location, so that they produced a melody by responding to the sequence 
(Contingent-Tone Group; CT-Group). In another condition, participants had the exact same training 
but for them, the tones were bound to the uncorrelated and irrelevant color sequence (Non-
Contingent-Tone Group, NCT-Group). This led to the effect that both conditions had the exact same 
response sequence and heard the same melody but only in the CT-Group, the effect-tones were 
contingent to the key-presses. This is basically a replication of Experiment 2 in Study 2, with a slightly 
different manipulation of the action-effect contingency. In Study 2 the manipulation of the response 
device affected the internal representation of the task and thus, depending on the induced task-set, 
the tones were either bound to the sequential dimension (color) or to another, irrelevant dimension 
(location). This might have led to a somewhat greater variance since participants in Study 2 could 
vary in their internal weighting of the different response dimensions. The manipulation in Study 3 
provided a clearer manipulation of the action-effect contingency because this time, the contingency 
did not depend on the internal coding of the task but instead was determined by the task itself. This 
difference between Study 2 and 3, in combination with the switch from a visual to a motor sequence, 
might help to provide an even clearer data picture. 
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An even more important novelty of Study 3 is that we manipulated the interpretation of the 
action effects as being response-independent stimulus events or as action-dependent effects. In a 
third condition participants had the exact same training as the other two groups. Also, this third 
condition experienced the same response-tone contingency as the CT-Group. The only difference 
was that this time, the tone did not immediately follow the response, as it was the case for the CT-
Group. Instead, it followed with a 400 ms delay to the response (Stimulus-Tone-Group, ST-Group). 
The temporal delay between an action and a following stimulus has repeatedly shown to be an 
important factor in perceiving an event as an action-effect or as an action-independent stimulus 
(Blakemore et al., 2002; Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Comparing the ST- to the CT-Group helps ruling out 
the possible alternative explanation for the results of Study 2; namely that the manipulation of the 
response device led to more attention on the predictive dimensions which in turn led to greater 
associative strength, explaining the differences in explicit knowledge. Here, both conditions 
contained the exact same response-tone contingencies between the predictive elements of the 
sequence and there was no attentional difference between both conditions. The only difference was 
that the CT-Group was more likely to interpret the tones as consequences of their own actions, while 
the ST-Group was more likely to perceive these tones as action-independent stimulus events. Hence, 
showing that only the CT-Group expresses more explicit knowledge in a subsequent wager task, 
while the ST-Group does not, would be difficult to reconcile with a simple single-system 
strengthening account. The results might still be explained with a hybrid between single- and 
multiple-system accounts. For example, according to the model of Keele et al. (2003), the results 
could be explained by constituting that R-E learning is a form of multi-dimensional learning with 
explicit knowledge gradually developing. According to this explanation, the tones would enhance 
learning in the CT-Condition by constituting a correlated sequence to the visual sequence. To deal 
with this explanation we also included a forth control group, who had the same training task but 
without any tones. According to the model of Keele et al., multidimensional learning is perturbed 
when a sequence is interspersed with unpredictive elements. If indeed a multi-dimensional learning 
process was responsible for the CT-Condition showing an increase in explicit knowledge, then the 
same multi-dimensional learning mechanism should be perturbed in the NCT-Condition by the non-
contingent tones. In this case the NCT-Condition should show less knowledge than the control 
condition which did not hear any tones.  
Study 3 revealed that only participants who perceived the tones as contingent effects of their 
own actions (CT-Group) showed an increase in explicit knowledge. Bayesian statistics showed that all 
other conditions (NCT-, ST-, and No-tone Control-Group) did not show any difference in their explicit 
knowledge. Together, the results of Study 2 and 3 are able to provide converging evidence that R-E 
learning plays an important role for the emergence of explicit sequence knowledge. Even though 
these studies do not directly contain any test on whether learning about the R-E relations indeed 
leads to unexpected events, the UEH seems to be a good explanatory framework for the data. 
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Together the studies are not conforming to any straight-forward predictions any single-system 
theory would make. Especially the comparison of the CT- and the ST-Group in Study 3, who were 
trained with the same sequential material, make an argumentation based on associative strength 
difficult. Instead, they suggest that contingently producing the same effect leads to different salient 
cues which can indicate that there is a meaningful relation between one’s actions and stimuli in the 
environment, which in turn can trigger search processes for the underlying contingencies resulting in 
the acquisition of explicit knowledge.  
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6 Conclusion 
Our brains are able to pick up an enormous amount of information in parallel and adapt to its 
structure. In many cases, these learned statistical relations are either too complex or support 
fundamental cognitive functions (e.g. increasing neuronal sensitivity towards certain objects we 
encounter often) and therefore do not need to be represented consciously. Following a functional 
view on consciousness, we need conscious processing to control information in a highly flexible, 
strategically adaptive way. Once information is available to the global workspace network, it can be 
accessed by any specialized network so that any mental operation is enabled for this globally 
broadcasted information. A new, consciously represented rule can be applied without, or with hardly 
any, previous practice. It can be transferred to a new situation or be inhibited. It can be evaluated 
whether we have learned similar rules before and whether it would be reasonable to replace old 
knowledge with the new rule and never use the old rule again. We can share our new knowledge 
with any person verbally if we want to. So obviously, becoming consciously aware of the fact that 
something has been learned comes with various behavioral advantages. The important question is 
how can we know that we know something, when we have never consciously represented this 
knowledge before?  
The GWT and the HOTT both provide a starting point for the question how an unconscious 
representation can become a conscious one. Moreover, both theories together might compensate 
for each other's weaknesses. The GWT provides a very strong framework for conceptualizing implicit 
and explicit representations via their encapsulation, respectively their accessibility. Its asset 
compared to the HOTT is that it is much clearer about the mechanism how and why an unconscious 
representation is selected over any other competing unconscious representation. The selection for 
access to the global workspace is realized via a variation-selection mechanism. At the bottom-up 
level, each unconscious representation can be characterized by a certain activational strength based 
on factors like salience or associative strength. All of these representations constantly compete for 
access to the global workspace and the strongest representation will win this competition. However, 
the activational strength of each representation is not based on these bottom-up factors alone. On 
the top-down level there always is a certain conscious state that represents the goal states in any 
given situation. These goal states provide a fitness function for the competing bottom-up signals. An 
unconscious representation that has a rather weak bottom-up signal strength can gain significantly in 
strength if it fits well into the current situational requirements.  
The HOTT instead provides no indication of how the problem of the selection of multiple 
possibly relevant and competing representations gets solved. It remains completely open when 
which representation will be conscious in a given situation. Rather, it is concerned with the question 
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how a learning mechanism might be realized which is able to build meta-knowledge. In the GWT, 
these meta-cognitive processes are one of many different functions the information in the global 
workspace has access to and are not payed special attention to. In any HOTT, these processes are the 
core functions of consciousness. With respect to the question how knowledge of which we do not 
know that we possess it can become conscious, HOTTs play a significant role. It seems very unlikely 
that an unconsciously acquired representation could gain so much bottom-up strength on its own 
that a breakthrough into the global workspace, regardless of any current conscious content, could 
happen. Even the first and more simplistic draft of Cleeremans' and Jiménez' (2002) single-system 
theory pronounces that some top-down process has to be involved which puts the unconscious 
representation into the focus of attention. All important theories on the transition from implicit to 
explicit knowledge assume that metacognition plays a crucial role in evoking a conscious state that 
allows unconscious knowledge to be detected (Cleeremans, 2008, 2011; Dienes & Perner, 1999; 
Frensch et al., 2003).Three different conceptions can be characterized which aim to explain how 
conscious sequence knowledge results from implicit learning via meta-cognitive processes.  
The first fits the suggestions from Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002). What is needed is a 
fitness-function provided by the current conscious workspace, which can enhance the activational 
strength of a certain unconscious representation enough to grant it access to the global workspace.  
Even though Cleeremans and Jiménez did not specify how this top-down process could be initiated, 
metacognition like, for example, a feeling of fluency could play an important part here. To put it 
simple, a person who has acquired unconscious knowledge somehow needs a conscious state that 
makes them ask themselves “Why do I feel like that?”. This seems similar to the assumptions of the 
UEH. However, opposed to the UEH, the idea here is not that a new explicit learning process acquired 
a new explicit representation but instead, the formerly encapsulated knowledge is “loaded” into the 
workspace. Now the implicit representation is connected to and accessed by a broad amount of 
subsystems, like, most important to the paradigm, speech modules. There is however one 
fundamental problem with this account. Different to unconsciously processed stimuli in the 
environment which can be attended to be processed consciously, encapsulated implicit knowledge is 
conceptualized as internal prediction-weights influencing the expectation of the next stimulus or 
next response. There is nothing about these associative weights per se that can become conscious; 
there is no corresponding distal event to that knowledge. As Cleeremans (2011) later put it himself, 
the implicitly acquired sequence knowledge is knowledge in the system, but not for the system.  
Therefore, the second assumption, which incorporates meta-cognitive processes explicitly 
also stems from Cleeremans (2008, 2011, 2014). This time the problem of what could be the 
conscious content of a formerly implicit representation that now is accessed by various subsystems, 
is circumvented. Instead, a new meta-cognitive representation is created on its own. The result of 
this learning process is knowledge for the system. The cognitive system learns about its own internal 
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states and how these relate to events in the environment. This conception has proven to be viable in 
replicating human data of metacognitive judgements via computational models. Yet, it remains that 
the assumption here is a gradual transition from unconscious to conscious knowledge. Further, it 
remains open how the moment a person reports insight into the sequence is determined. Moreover 
it remains unclear at which point other subsystems gain access to this meta-knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the account from Cleeremans and colleagues surely is an interesting, important and 
testable assumption.  
The third and last conception is the UEH. It is proposed that higher-order learning processes 
lead to expectations of the subjective experience in a particular situation, based on experiences in 
similar situations in the past. A mismatch between the expectation of one’s own experience and the 
actual experience will trigger the need for an explanation. When someone participates in an SRTT, 
they might become very fast over the course of training, however this might still match the 
subjectively perceivable expectation of mere practice. Yet, suddenly encountering a random block 
with a higher amount of errors made and moreover the sudden feeling of becoming slower, or the 
responses feeling less fluent, is a strong unexpected event in one’s own experience. Contrary to the 
first of the three suggestions here, this unexpected event does not allow the first-order implicit 
representation to become conscious. Instead, and more similar to the second account, a new explicit 
representation has to be created. What the unexpected event does is to direct attention to an 
erroneous model of the expected experiences and its apparent need for an update that re-
establishes congruency between expectations and actual experiences. A decisive difference to the 
model of Cleeremans (2008) is that the explicit learning process, which is based on hypothesis testing 
and not on associative strength, leads to a sudden insight rather than to a gradual development. 
Moreover, the UEH is able to explain why the sequence knowledge will remain implicit whenever 
another more plausible explanation for the violation of expectancy is found (Haider & Frensch, 2005).  
It was therefore the aim of the current studies to test the relevance of representational 
strength, as it is pronounced by the account from Cleeremans (2008), against the assumptions of the 
UEH (Frensch et al., 2003). All three studies presented here were aimed at finding a method to 
balance the representational quality via keeping the associative strength equal, while at the same 
time manipulating the likelihood of experiencing an unexpected event.  
Taken together, all three studies provided new and converging evidence for the assumptions 
of the UEH. First and foremost it has been demonstrated that the emergence of explicit sequence 
knowledge is related to the opportunity to perceive unexpected metacognitive feelings (i.e. an 
unexpected difference in the feeling of fluency, Experiment 3 of Study 1) or unexpected effects 
produced by one’s own actions (Experiment 2 of Study 2, and Study 3). The use of different 
manipulations for the likelihood to experience an unexpected event is crucial for investigating the 
UEH. In the UEH, any event with the potential to make one ask why a mismatch between one’s 
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expectation and actual behavior occurred can trigger explicit learning processes. Moreover, a broad 
variety of manipulations for the occurrence of unexpected events of course also helps ruling out 
alternative explanations of possible side effects each single manipulation brings. 
A second major point made by all three studies is that the manipulations of the internal 
change of metacognitive experience as well as the externally observable change in produced action-
effects did not seem to affect implicit learning processes but instead affected an additional explicit 
learning process. This was most directly tested in Experiment 3 of Study 2, where the 50% randomly 
inserted irregular trials led to a disappearance of the effect of the response-device manipulation 
which has been shown to lead to more explicit learning in Experiment 1 and 2.  Moreover, implicit 
learning was not affected by the insertion of irregular trials and there was no advantage in implicit 
learning for the group that still experienced a contingent action-effect relation in at least 50% 
percent of the trials.  Further supporting evidence for a selective effect on explicit learning by the 
different manipulations also can be found in Experiment 1 of Study 1 and in Study 3. In Experiment 1 
of Study 1, the arrangement of regular and irregular trials did not affect the amount of learning as 
measured by the wager task. In Study 3 we exploratively removed all participants with entirely 
explicit knowledge and also no longer found a gradual advantage in knowledge for the group that 
had experienced contingent action-effect relations.  
Lastly, a third very important point of all presented studies is that the experiments provided 
different designs which aimed to carefully match the associative strength across the different 
conditions. This equalized associative strength can help with two problems in implicit learning 
research. First, from a methodological view, our different methods for balancing associative strength 
are important for meeting the justified objections from researchers like Lau (20008b).  Lau demanded 
manipulations of the subjective judgements while matching signal strength in order to investigate 
unconscious processes without performance biases. It can be shown that the implicitly built 
knowledge base (a) is already a strong representation on its own (d’ > 0) and (b) is comparable across 
the different groups. Especially Experiment 1 of Study 1 is suited for demonstrating that the 
manipulation of the subjective experience of the task did not affect the implicit knowledge base. 
Experiment 2 of Study 1 showed that the subjective experience can differ despite the comparable 
implicit knowledge base. Second, and even more important in the context of the goals of all three 
studies, is the theoretical advance this matching of associative strength brings. Due to the differences 
in explicit knowledge, despite equalized representational strength between conditions, a simple 
strengthening account (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002) or a more complex higher-order strengthening 
account (Cleeremans, 2008) has difficulties to explain these results. There is no explicit assumption in 
any of these single-system accounts that can explain why there are differences in explicit knowledge 
between the groups, or why implicit learning did not seem to be affected by any of our manipulations. 
Conclusion 
56 
 
Rather, an account like the UEH which proposes an additional explicit learning process that is triggered 
by observable changes in one’s own behavior seems favorable.  
However, the results presented here are not able to completely rule out an explanation 
based on strengthening mechanisms, respectively not all assumptions of the UEH have been tested. 
A next step would be to show that the manipulations of subjective experiences like the experienced 
differences in fluency or distal action-effects actually constitute an unexpected event for the 
participants. This of course could be done by detailed interviews of the participants in their 
subjective perception of the training. While such interviews might surely be an important first step 
for investigating the subjective feeling of surprise, it is not the most direct test. It only provides data 
about the retrospective reconstructions of feelings of fluency during the training. An online measure 
of surprise during training might be even more insightful. This could be achieved by using EEG or 
fMRT data. Butterfield and Mangles (2003) for example have shown that the fronto-central P3a 
amplitude shows increased positivity when a metacognitive mismatch, i.e. a conflict between 
metacognitive expectations (for example the expectation to produce very few errors) and the actual 
outcome, occurred. Furthermore, the anterior cingulate cortex, the medial frontal gyrus and the 
cingulate cortex have been associated with metacognitive mismatch in an fMRT study by Metcalfe, 
Butterfield, Habeck, and Stern (2012). It would thus be interesting to investigate whether the 
different arrangement of regular and irregular stimuli leads to a difference in the activity in these 
areas. It would probably be best to use the specific design of Experiment 1 and 2 of Study 1. Here,  
the rather short mini-blocks of regular and irregular trials did not lead to explicit knowledge despite 
affecting the subjectively perceivable changes of fluency. This way it could be circumvented that 
explicit sequence knowledge contaminates the data. Once it could be shown that the manipulation 
of the fluency can be associated with a measure for metacognitive mismatches, the design could be 
extended in order to show that the moment a mismatch is detected stands in close relation to 
detecting the sequence. This could be achieved by, for example, analyzing the data for sudden RT-
drops as suggested by Haider and Rose (2007; Rose et al., 2010).  Moreover, neuroimaging data like 
the sudden coupling of gamma-band activity, respectively increases of the BOLD-signal in the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum could be 
analyzed (Rose et al., 2010; Schuck et al., 2015; Wessel et al., 2012). This would provide a necessary 
test of the prediction of the UEH that unexpected events lead to a sudden onset of hypothesis testing 
and subsequent detection of the sequence, instead of a slowly, gradually developing explicit 
representation as assumed by Cleeremans (2008).  
In order to further exclude a single-system explanation, it would be important to show in a 
more direct way that unexpected events lead to the development of a new representation via 
hypothesis testing, instead of somehow transforming the implicit representation into an explicit one. 
To achieve this, again the design of Experiment 1 and 2 of Study 1 could be used to train participants 
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until they start to perceive differences in their feeling of fluency when trained with the blocked 
material and then presenting them a new, unknown sequence. Showing more explicit knowledge for 
the new sequence when participants were trained with the blocked arrangement of the material, 
than when trained with the randomly arranged material, would make a strong point that the 
sequence is explicitly searched and learned instead of being derived from the implicit knowledge 
base.  
Taken together, the studies provide further, converging evidence that the experience of 
unexpected events lead to the emergence of explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation. Such 
unexpected events can be characterized as a metacognitive mismatch between the expectancy of 
internal states as well as the expected observable effects of one’s own behavior and the actually 
experienced internal state, respectively behavioral effects. The current studies should encourage 
further investigations which focus on (a) the close relation between the occurrence of an unexpected 
event and a sudden insight into the hidden regularity and (b) the assumption that explicit learning 
processes lead to a new representation which is independent of the implicitly learned one.  
The introduced designs of all three studies provide three different, practicable and powerful 
manipulations of the occurrence of unexpected events while matching associative strength. They can 
also be flexibly adjusted to different research questions investigating the relation and the differences 
between unconscious and conscious processing. Designs like the presented ones can, for example, be 
of value for further development in the debate about the source signals for metacognitive learning 
processes. Increasing the options to manipulate or balance first-order signal strength while 
independently varying metacognitive judgements can help to distinguish between models that are 
based on a single channel bottom-up relation (e.g. Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003), 
hierarchical models (e.g. Maniscalco & Lau, 2016) where different processes underlie objective and 
subjective judgements, but the latter always evaluates the judgmental quality of the former, or dual 
channel models, where objective and subjective judgements are based on fully independent 
cognitive processes (e.g. Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009). Understanding the 
fundament of metacognitive learning processes is highly important to several practical areas. This 
includes educational contexts, where the ability to accurately judge one’s own knowledge base is 
crucial to self-regulated learning (Karpicke, 2009), research on artificial intelligence, where 
metacognitive expectancy deviations are a key variable to perturbation-tolerant behavior (Anderson 
& Perils, 2005), or mental illnesses like pathological gambling (Brevers et al., 2014), schizophrenia 
(Moritz et al., 2016) or autism (Williams, Bergström, & Grainger, 2016).
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